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NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES UNDER CERCLA:
FAILURES, LESSONS LEARNED, AND ALTERNATIVES
PATRICK E. TOLAN, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA) was passed in the aftermath of the Love Canal tragedy.'
CERCLA's Superfund enables emergency responders to clean up now and collect
from responsible parties later.2 CERCLA is renowned for imposing joint, strict, and
several liability upon potentially responsible parties (PRPs) who are accountable for
addressing environmental contamination due to the release or disposal of hazardous
substances. 3 This liability without fault, coupled with the multi-million dollar costs
of cleanup typically involved for major contamination sites,4 quickly captured the
attention of the regulated community. 5

* Professor Patrick E. Tolan, BSEE United States Air Force Academy, J.D. University of Michigan Law
School, LL.M. George Washington University, is an Associate Professor of Law at Barry University Law School
in Orlando, Florida, where he teaches environmental law, government contracts, tax, and property. The author
thanks Jessica VanValkenburgh and Jessica Jordan for their outstanding research in support of this article and
Professors Barry Dubner and Leticia Diaz for their constructive and insightful feedback.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)) [hereinafter
CERCLA]. Love Canal was a landfill for tons of hazardous chemical wastes that came to national attention in 1978
when toxic waste literally began seeping out of the ground. See Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA
JOURNAL, Jan. 1979, availableat http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01 .htm (last visited July 29, 2008).
The emergency resulted in the evacuation of over 200 homes near the canal. Id.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9611(a)(1) (2000).
3. The Senate dropped explicit reference to "strict, joint, and several" liability in a last minute substitute
bill. See James R. MacAyeal, The ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse, Compensation,and LiabilityAct: The
Correct Paradigmof Strict Liabilityand the Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
217, 257, 272 (2000/2001). For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of CERCLA, see id. at 253-79.
Although CERCLA does not expressly characterize the damages as "joint" "strict" or "several," the courts have
consistently done so. See, e.g., United States v. Ad. Research Corp. 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2336 (2007)
("[E]ven parties not responsible for contamination may fall within the broad definition of PRPs."). The Atlantic
Research Court cited with approval United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2003)
("CERCLA § 9607 is a strict liability statute."). See also United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 479
F.3d 1113, 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007) ("CERCLA is a 'super-strict' liability statute....Joint and several liability,
even for PRPs with a minor connection to the contaminated facility, is the norm, designed to assure, as far as
possible, that some entity with connection to the contamination picks up the tab."), rev'd on othergrounds, 2008
WL 763257 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2008); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir.
1998), abrogatedin part,United States v. Ad. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331; Metro. Water Reclamation Dist.
of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007) ("liability under §
107(a) is strict,joint and several-except rare cases where harm is divisible"); United States v. Monsanto, Co., 858
F.2d 160, 168-170, (4th Cir. 1988) (liability attaches "regardless of [the] degree of participation"); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,1043-45, (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing the four classes of people CERCLA holds
liable under § 9607(a) and that "Congress specifically rejected including a causation requirement in [that
section]").
4. While costs vary considerably based on the scope of contamination and characteristics of the sites, EPA
spends, on average, $220 million from the Superfund annually on removal actions (typically responses lasting less
than one year and costing less than two million dollars) and considerably more on remedial actions. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SuPERFUND PROGRAM: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE FISCALCHALLENGES, GAO-03-850
at 6 (2003) [hereinafter GAO, 2003 STATUS & CHALLENGES], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsl
d03850.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Irvin Molotsky, Senate PanelNears Approval of Waste Cleanup Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1980, at 54 (discussing chemical manufacturer testimony alleging that the bill is "seriously defective in its overly
broad scope, its punitive approach to liability and in its excessive funding levels").
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In addition to cleanup liability, Congress also included important damages
provisions in CERCLA to restore natural resources that had been injured or
destroyed due to a release of hazardous substances. Although less frequently
litigated, these natural resource damages (NRD) provisions created great anxiety
due to the inherently speculative nature of valuing lost resources and the benefits
derived from those resources, coupled with the vast magnitude of potential liability
(as demonstrated by the $900 million NRD settlement of the Exxon Valdez case).6
Some observers feared that NRDs had the potential to make CERCLA cleanup costs
dim in comparison. 7 For instance, one commentator called NRDs the next "Black
Hole" of environmental liability.NRDs have long been called the "Sleeping Giant"
because the potential for recoveries remains largely untapped.9
The virtually boundless magnitude of CERCLA NRDs caught this author's
attention when the State of New Mexico filed a two-billion dollar NRD claim
against the Air Force in 1999.0 The two billion dollar figure seemed to come from
thin air. Then, it grew to four billion dollars before it materialized as 1.28 billion
dollars when the case went to court in 2004.1 New Mexico left that battle emptyhanded, and lost again on appeal in 2006, in significant part due to its inability to
properly quantify damages. 12 Others can learn important lessons from New
Mexico's failures in this case, so they are not condemned to repeat them.
In the summer of 2007, New Jersey's Attorney General "filed approximately 120
lawsuits that could result in hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation from
polluters who have harmed New Jersey's natural resources...."13 This wave of

6. See Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) ("Exxon
agreed to pay the governments at least $900 million (and possibly an additional $100 million)....").
7. See John J. Fried, After Cleanup, The Environment's Bill Comes Due, PHILA. INQUIRER, March 13,
1994, at E01.
8. Susanne Sclafane, NRD Claims Muddy Insurance Waters, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTYRISK & BENEFITS MGMT. Apr. 11, 2005 at 24, available at 2005 WLNR 6452083.
9. See Terry Fox, Comment, NaturalResource Damages: The New FrontierofEnvironmentalLitigation,
34 S. TEX. L. REV. 521, 537 n. 112 (citing More Liabilities Coming Your Way: Tidal Waves and Natural
Resources, ENERGY ECONOMIST, July 1992, at 2 (calling natural resource damages "the sleeping giant or the next
frontier of the CERCLA-Superfund" program) and CMA CriticizesRCRA CorrectiveAction, Superfund Liability,
PESTICIDE &Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS, Mar. 25, 1992, at 2 (referring to natural resource damages as the "'sleeping
giant' of Superfund")); see also Fried, supranote 7, at EO 1 (reporting that because many corporations "have never
heard of' NRDs, "the assements lurk like a 'sleeping giant'); Smith Tries to Avert Explosion of NaturalResource
Damages,HAZ. WASTE NEWS, July 10, 1995, at 17 (when Department of Interior NRD rules are promulgated may
be when the "sleeping giant wakes up" (internal quotations omitted)). Yet, many NRD claims were historically
resolved as part of a comprehensive settlement between PRPs and the EPA and almost half "make no separate
payment for natural resource damages either because the negotiated cleanup will correct the injury to the natural
resource or because no such injuries were found." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: OUTLOOK FOR AND
EXPERIENCE WITH NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE SETTLEMENTS, RCED-96-71 at 4-5 (1996) [hereinafter GAO,
SETTLEMENTS OUTLOOK], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc96071.pdf.

10. The Author was the principal environmental attorney at Kirtland Air Force Base responsible for the local
team evaluating (and ultimately recommending denial of) the claim. Although the matter arose in the context of
the Author's official duties at the time, the views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense.
11. The Air Force had been dropped as a defendant at the time the case was decided. See New Mexico v.
Gen. Elec. Co. (Gen. Elec. 1),
335 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D.N.M. 2003); New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Gen. Elec.
I), 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1231 (D.N.M. 2004); New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Gen. Elec. 111),
467 F.3d 1223
(10th Cir. 2006).
12. Gen. Elec. II1, 467 F.3d at 1242.
13. Press Release, N.J. Office of the Att'y Gen., State Files Lawsuits Seeking Compensation for Damages
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litigation reflects a continuation of New Jersey's aggressive NRD approach to
investigate and pursue over 4,000 cases.14 Some have asserted that these cases are
"waking the sleeping giant,"' 5 yet the ultimate outcome of the most recent cases is
anything but certain, as the courts in New Jersey continue to struggle with NRD
claims by the State based upon CERCLA and the New Jersey Spill Compensation
and Control Act. 6
This ongoing litigation is establishing the legal framework for the proper
assessment and collection of natural resource damages under state law and how
state enforcement efforts interface with and are limited by the parallel (perhaps
complementary, but perhaps conflicting) remedies under CERCLA. 7 Although the
past couple of years have seen a resurgence of interest in pursuing NRDs, 8
numerous challenges to litigating these claims continue to keep most trustees out
of the courtroom. Experts predict that many state trustees are awaiting the outcome
of the New Jersey cases before adopting similar measures. 9
At the same time, behind the scenes, trustees have been attaining their greatest
successes through settlement and cooperative arrangements with PRPs that foster
restoration.2 ° Corrective changes to the NRD laws are still necessary to foster a
more effective route for litigation. A Federal Advisory Committee Report (FAC
Report) issued in May 2007 lays the groundwork for regulatory changes to make

Polluters Caused to Natural Resources (June 29,2007), http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases07/pr20070629a.html
(last visited Jun. 24, 2008). Since June of 2007, a number of cases have settled generating over $4 million and 700
acres of protected natural resources; http://www.state.nj.us/dep/newsrelV2008/08_0038.htm (last visited Dec. 21,
2008). Consent decrees and updates on settled cases may be found at http://www.state.nj.us/dep/nrr/settlements/
(last visited Dec. 21, 2008).
14. See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Policy Directive 2003-07 (Sept. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.nj.gov/dep/commissioner/policy/pdir2003-07.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2008); Press Release, N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., DEP to Address More Than 4,000 Potential Claims for Natural Resource Damages Statewide,
Commissioner Campbell Orders Passaic River Restoration: Parties Responsible for Pollution Must Assess and
Restore Natural Resource Injuries (Sept. 24, 2003), http://www.nj.gov/dep/newsreVreleases/03_0131.htm (last
visited Aug. 15, 2008).
15. See John Tomlin, Comment, Waking the Sleeping Giant: Analyzing New Jersey's Pursuit of Natural
Resource Damages from Responsible Polluting Parties in the Lower Passaic River, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 235,
236 (2005) ("the sleeping giant is waking, and industry had better beware"); Shawn Kelly et al., New Jersey's
Natural Resource Damages Initiative: Is the "Sleeping Giant" Waking Up?, 56 FEDERATION OF DEFENSE &
CORPORATE COUNSEL (FDCC) QUARTERLY 345 (2006), available at 2006 WLNR 11945069 (New Jersey's
initiative "may well herald similar programs in other states").
16. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11 (West 2006).
17. Investigating other state NRD recovery methods is an important area for continued research. Indeed,
to the extent federal laws are inadequate, the only recourse short of congressional legislative change remains with
the States.
18. See Brian D. Israel, Natural Resource Damage Claims: Strategiesfor Responding to Increased Federal
and State Enforcement, ABA TRENDS, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 4, available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/
documents/Arnold%20&%2OPorter%2LLP.Natura%2OResource%2ODamange%2Caims.Brian%201srae.Tr
ends.Fall%202006.pdf (showing increase from 12 Department of Justice cases in 2003 to 22 cases in 2005); Press
Release, supra note 13 (NJ files 120 NRD lawsuits in summer of 2007).
19. See BRIAN D. ISRAEL, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE §

32B.08[4] at 32B-80 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., Lexis Nexis 2006), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/
resources/documents/IsraelNRDChapter2006.pdf; Kelly et al., supra note 15, at 397 (if successful, more
litigation is likely and if unsuccessful, "the feared NRD 'trend' will die on the vine").
20. These measures seem to be successful in spite of the archaic adversarial NRDA scheme. See infra Part

V.
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restoration of natural resources "faster, more efficient, and more effective."', The
FAC Report recommendations portend a new era in NRD assessment.2 2 These
recommendations should be matched by congressional resolve to appropriate
sufficient resources to trustees in order to allow trustees to fund assessment and
restoration efforts where PRPs are not cooperative.
Although cooperative assessment is indeed the wave of the future, the promise
of continued beneficial partnering between the government trustees and industry
will only survive if a credible threat of litigation remains. Thus, enhancing laws to
better posture the government to litigate and win helps ensure that PRPs are
motivated to settle.23 Therefore, all pieces of this complex puzzle must be analyzed
in concert.
This Article examines lessons learned from NRD litigation to explain why a tool
with so much potential to benefit the environment has remained underutilized. It
also explores the bigger picture, examining and advocating promising alternatives
to litigation in appropriate cases. Finally, it advocates corrective regulatory and
statutory action to enable the NRD scheme to meet its full potential.
Following this Introduction, Part 1I of this Article establishes CERCLA
fundamentals concerning natural resource damages. A major flaw with the NRD
program is that trustees may not routinely access the Superfund for Natural
Resource Damage Assessments.24 Additional challenges in evaluating and assessing
NRDs are also discussed in Part II. This part explains the evolution of regulations
governing assessment of NRDs, as well as recent proposals from a federal advisory
panel to improve our national approach to natural resource damage assessment.
Part I looks in detail at problems inherent in the New Mexico NRD approach.
Specifically, six pitfalls that must be avoided by trustees are identified and discussed. It is crucial to understand the failures in NRD application if they are to be
avoided or correctively addressed.
Part IV of this article studies alternatives with more promise. It evaluates the
relative merits of the New Jersey approach, discussing both advantages and
vulnerabilities. It also examines how other states are pursuing NRDs and considers
empirical data that tend to highlight impediments to NRD recovery. The "valuation"
question is the lynchpin to NRD awards, so the difficult tensions between precision
and expediency are examined in detail.
Part V examines the trend toward cooperation versus litigation. It identifies the
many advantages of a cooperative approach for PRPs and trustees alike. It also
explores the trade-offs a PRP must make when embracing such an approach.
Finally, Part VI explores regulatory and legislative changes to strengthen CERCLA
NRD recoverability.

21. NATURAL RES. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION FED. ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT 7 (2007)
[hereinafter 2007 FAC REPORT], available at http://restoration.doi.gov/pdf/facamtg5_finalreport.pdf.
22. See id.; see also infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text.
23. Indeed, the uncertainty in valuation and the prospect of unlimited damages is a factor driving
settlements now. If the courts impose awards on a lesser scale in the cases now pending, the desire to cooperate may
in many circumstances evaporate.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 961 1(b)(2) (2000) (restrictions on natural resource damages payable by the Superfund).
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HI. BACKGROUND
A. NaturalResource Damages Under CERCLA
CERCLA defines "natural resources" as:
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and
other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to,
or otherwise controlled by the United States.. .any State or local government, any
foreign government, any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust
restriction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.'
The term "damages" means damages for "injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable'2 6costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or
loss resulting from such a release."
Natural resource damages are above and beyond the cost of cleanup under
CERCLA.27 The legislation explicitly allows recovery of NRDs in addition to the
costs of emergency removal actions or remediation. 2' The costs of assessing the
lingering damages to natural resources are also expressly recoverable as NRDs.29
In 1986, CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).3 ° SARA required the President to designate in the National
Contingency Plan federal officials "who shall act on behalf of the public as trustees
for natural resources" under CERCLA and the Clean Water Act.3 SARA simultaneously tasked the governors of each State to designate State Natural Resource
Trustees.32
B. The Trustee's Role and Responsibilities
Trustees are charged to act on behalf of the public to recover for damages to
natural resources and to use such funds "to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources....
SARA created a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the trustees whenever they make a damage determination in accordance
with duly promulgated regulations. 34 The presumption applies in both administrative
and judicial proceedings. 35 However, the trustees are not required to follow the
regulations when performing Natural Resource Damage Assessments (NRDAs).36

25. Id. § 9601(16).
26. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
27. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (2007).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) to (C).
29. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
30. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613-97
(1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, §§ 6926-6991 and §§ 11001-11050; 10 U.S.C. §§
2701-2707; 26 U.S.C. § 59A, §§ 4671-4672 and §§ 9506-9508) [hereinafter SARA].
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A).
32. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(B).
33. Id. § 9607(0(1).
34. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(C). Although such regulations were commanded in 1980 to be developed within two
years, as of the passage of SARA in 1986 they had not yet been promulgated. See id. § 9651 (c)(1) (extending the
period an additional six months).
35. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(C).
36. See id. § 9607() (discussing the obligation of the trustee to recover NRDs; no mention of NRDA); id.
§ 965 1(c) (directing federal officials to study and promulgate regulations for assessing damages); see also Gen.
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A rebuttable presumption should provide an advantage in litigation to the trustee,
since the trustee must merely follow the NRDA rules, and the burden would then
shift to the defendant to establish that the assessment of damages was inaccurate.37
Given the complexity of valuing natural resources, such an advantage would appear
to be very powerful.38 As explained later, the regulations have not lived up to their
potential, so the benefit of the rebuttable presumption has not been fully realized.39
C. Challenges in Valuing and Assessing NRDs4 °
1. Evolution of the Assessment Regulations
In 1986, Congress gave the President "six more months, 41 to develop NRDA
regulations to specify:
(A) standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring minimal field
observation, including establishing measures of damages based on units of
discharge or release or units of affected area, and
(B) alternative protocols for conducting assessments in individual cases to

determine the type and extent of short- and long-term injury, destruction, or loss.
Such regulations shall identify the best available procedures to determine such
damages, including both direct and indirect injury, destruction, or loss and shall

Elec. 111, 467 F.3d 1223, 1235 (10th Cit. 2006) (finding no mandate to use federal regulations for assessment); 43
C.F.R. § 11.10 (2007) (assessment procedures not mandatory but must be used in order to obtain the rebuttable
presumption).
37. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (addressing similar
presumption under the Oil Pollution Act).
38. But see id. at 772 ("[I]t is not at all clear that the rebuttable presumption gives trustees a 'powerful
advantage."').
39. See id.(leaving the meaning and practical application of the rebuttable presumption unresolved). The
presumption has not been tested successfully in litigation. See ISRAEL, supra note 19, § 32B.06[2] at 32B-58. Of
course, it is impossible to determine how many PRPs may have been motivated to settle cases based on an
unwillingness to litigate in the face of the presumption.
40. While this Article emphasizes other problems, a synopsis of the key valuation shortcomings is necessary
to understand their intrinsic contribution to difficulties within the NRD scheme. For in-depth discussion concerning
problems with valuing NRDs, particularly the challenges in evaluating lost use or non-use of resources, see Frank
B. Cross, NaturalResource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L REv. 269, 270 (1989) ("The path to.. .valuation is
rife with pitfalls, both philosophical and practical."); see also JasonJ. Czamezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility
ofNon-use Values in NaturalResource DamageAssessments, 32 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 509 (2005) ("Non-use
values are frequently underestimated or ignored in natural resource damage assessments."); Allan Kanner & Tibor
Nagy, MeasuringLoss of Use Damages in Natural ResourceDamage Actions, 30 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 417, 418
(2005) (arguing that despite the "increasingly frequent suggestion [that] the public be deprived of [non-use]
damages" it is possible to value these damages and offering several suggestions including comparisons to the
valuation of other "non-market" damages such as pain and suffering in tort cases); Dale B. Thompson, Valuing
the Environment: Courts' Struggles with NaturalResource Damages,32 ENVTL. L. 57, 60 (2002) (valuation of
natural resource damages is difficult because it utilizes "non-market" valuation methods that do not have the "level
of certainty and concreteness" required by evidentiary standards).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1) (2000):
The President.. .shall study and, not later than two years after December 11, 1980, shall
promulgate regulations for the assessment of damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources resulting from a release of oil or a hazardous substance... .Notwithstanding the
failure of the President to promulgate the regulations required under this subsection on the
required date, the President shall promulgate such regulations not later than 6 months after
October 17, 1986 [the date SARA passed].
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take into consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement value,
use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover.42
Based upon the statute, regulations of simplified assessments, authorized in paragraph (A) above, have come to be known as "Type A" regulations, whereas detailed
assessments authorized in paragraph (B) are governed by "Type B" regulations.4 3
Under the National Contingency Plan, the Department of the Interior (DOI) was
charged to develop the Type A and Type B NRD regulations." The DOI recognized
that "damage assessments provide the basis for determining the restoration needs
that address the public's loss and use of these resources. 45 Nevertheless, regulations were difficult to craft because of the complexity of placing dollar values on
resources for which markets often do not exist, lack of experience in conducting
such valuations, and little precedent to guide trustee actions.46
Once finally promulgated, the regulations were attacked both by environmental
groups as well as industry, and these early cases sent DOI back to the drawing
board.47 For example, Ohio v. United States Departmentof the Interiorconsidered
the validity of the Type B regulations.4 8 The D.C. Circuit remanded these rules to
DOI, indicating that allowing valuation based on the lesser of restoration,
replacement, or diminution in use values (the "lesser of' rule) was contrary to
congressional intent to establish a "preference for restoration cost" as the best
measure of NRDs.4 9 The court indicated that alternatives to restoration cost would
be acceptable where restoration costs were impossible to calculate or "grossly
disproportionate" to the value of the use of the resource (use value).50
Though the court struck down DOI's approach to this first component of natural
resource damages (to compensate for lingering damages to the natural resource), it
affirmed DOI's policy toward calculating value for the second component, to
compensate for the temporary loss of services of these resources (also known as loss
of use damages). DOI's approach evaluates loss of services only if the resource was
committed to be used either through current use or planned public use, "for which
there is a documented, legal, administrative, budgetary, or financial commitment,"
before the hazardous release was detected.5 ' This "committed use" requirement
provides a bright line rule for the trustees and the courts in ascertaining the scope

42. Id. § 9651(c)(2) (emphasis added).
43. 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(d)-(e) (2006); see also Carl W. Breeding & Lloyd R. Cress, Jr., NaturalResource
Damages Under CERCLA: A New Beginning?, 20 N. KY. L.REV. 23, 36 (1992).
44. Exec. Order No. 12,316,46 Fed. Reg. 42,237, (Aug. 14, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,580,52 Fed. Reg.
2,923, (Jan. 23, 1987); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.600 (2006).
45. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration Program,
http://restoration.doi.gov/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
46. Breeding & Cress, supranote 43, at 28; see also GAO, SErTLEMENTS OUTLOOK, supranote 9, at 9-10,
27 (illustrating application of Type A and Type B procedures).
47.

See Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (challenging Type B regulations);

Colorado v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (challenging Type A regulations).
48.

880 F.2d 432.

49. Id. at 458-59.
50. Id. at 459.
51.

43 C.F.R. § 11.14(h) (2006).
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of lost services. The court noted that such a method "avoids the need for unreliable,
and likely self-serving, speculation regarding future possible uses."52
Finally, the D.C. Circuit considered whether contingent valuation (CV) was an
appropriate method when market-based valuation was either not available or was
not reflective of the true value of injured resources." CV employs surveys of public
opinion regarding the value of a lost resource, particularly lost nonuse of a
resource.54 The value of nonuse-simply knowing a resource exists-is sometimes
called existence value, option value (the option to use it), or bequest value (saving
it for posterity). 5 In order to capture all aspects of harm, the court upheld the CV
method to measure nonuse.
In summary, in Ohio the court affirmed DOI's "committed use" policy and the
controversial CV approach, but sent DOI back to the drawing board with important
direction concerning the Type B regulations. However, the court's work in
clarifying the NRD regulations was not over, as challenges to the Type A
regulations were simultaneously pending.
56
decided by the court
In Coloradov. United States Departmentof the Interior,
the same day, the D.C. Circuit evaluated the Type A regulations.57 Ironically, the
"simplified" Type A regulations were promulgated after and mirrored the complex,
four-step, Type B regulations.5" In addition to the shortcomings in valuation
methodology (discussed in Ohio, and resulting in remand), the regulations were
challenged as not conforming to Congress's intent for "standard procedures for
simplified assessments of natural resource damages."59 Specifically, the regulations
would afford procedures for Type A assessment in coastal and marine environments
only. Further, the damages were to be calculated using computer modeling.'
Despite these limitations, these aspects of the Type A regulations were upheld.6'
2. Toward Habitat Equivalency Analysis
After the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA) and directed the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) to promulgate regulations to assess natural resource damages due to oil
spills in coastal and marine environments.62 Although not directly applicable to

52. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462. Because of this, the "committed use' standard is an eminently reasonable
construction of the statute." id.
53. Id. at 475-78.
54. See Miriam Montesinos, Comment, It May Be Silly, But It's an Answer: The Need to Accept Contingent
Valuation Methodology In Natural Resource DamageAssessments, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 48, 78 (1999) ("Federal
courts, DOI and experts have agreed that nonuse values must be included and have provided for nonuse values to
be part of NRD assessments."). However, state laws may expressly prohibit non-use.
55. Id. at 50.
56. 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
57. The D.C. Circuit is the exclusive venue forreviewof CERCLA regulations. 42 U.S.C. §9613(a) (2000).
58. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9042 (1987) (codified as amended at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.30-11.84 (2006)).
59. Colorado, 880 F.2d at 485, 491.
60. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9042,9048 (Mar. 20, 1987); 43 C.F.R. § 11.41 (2006) (discussion of NRDA Model
for Coastal and Marine Environment). A model for great lakes contaminations was developed in 1996. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 20,560, 20,611 (May 7, 1996) (codified at 43 C.F.R § 11.40 (2006)).
61. Colorado, 880 F.2d at 491.
62. Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 1006(e)(l) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (2000)). "For natural resource
damages resulting from a discharge or release of a mixture of oil and hazardous substances, trustees must use 43
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CERCLA NRDAs, the NOAA methodology of habitat equivalency analysis is worth
considering here, because it is restoration-focused (as Congress intended CERCLA
to be),63 because it has led to the successful resolution of NRD cases,' because the
approach has withstood judicial scrutiny, 65 and because it contains features that the
Federal Advisory Committee is recommending to DOI for further study and
implementation.66 In addition, because trustees are not required to follow the DOI
regulations, the NOAA approach presents a reasoned alternative for trustees to use
in evaluating CERCLA damages.6 7
NOAA explains that habitat equivalency analysis (HEA) is:
a methodology used to determine compensation for... resource injuries. The
principal concept underlying the method is that the public can be compensated
for past losses of habitat resources through 6habitat replacement projects
providing additional resources of the same type. 1
NOAA uses HEA to calculate both primary restoration (the cost to restore any
injured resources to their baseline condition) and compensatory restoration (the cost
to compensate for interim lost use of the injured resources).69 Where a responsible
party agrees with the analysis, it may conduct the restoration activities itself, subject
to monitoring by the trustees to ensure the project meets performance requirements.7 ° In such a scenario, the need never arises to place a dollar figure on natural
resource damages.
Even when the responsible party refuses to conduct the restoration, the
calculation of damages using HEA is less cumbersome. HEA focuses on restorationbased assessments, thereby bypassing the valuation of injured resources themselves
and focusing instead on the costs to actually restore or replace the resources. 7
Notably, the HEA approach avoids the controversial CV methodology, 72 jumpstarts

C.F.R. part 11 in order to obtain a rebuttable presumption." 15 C.F.R. § 990.20(c) (2006).
63. See Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
64. See Nat. Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Assessment & Restoration Division website,
http://www.response.restoration.noaa.gov/orr-about-owner.php?RECORD-KEY%28owner-chosen%29=owne
r_id&owner_id(owner_chosen)=7 (last visited July 28, 2008) (over 95-percent settlement rate).
65. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also United
States v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 259 F.3d 1300, 1305-06 (11 th Cir. 2001) (withstanding Daubert
analysis); United States v. Fisher, 977 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (S.D. Fla. 1997) affd, 174 F.3d 201 (11 th Cir. 1999)
(unpublished table decision).
66. 2007 FAC REPORT, supranote 21, at 19.
67. 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (2006); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767 (validating
NOAA restoration-based approach).
68. NAT. OcEANIc & ATMosPHERIC ADMIN., HABITAT EQUIVALENCY ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW 1(2006),
http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/heaoverv.pdf.
69. Id. at 2. Natural resource trustees have employed HEA for groundings, spills, and hazardous waste sites.

Id.
70. ld. at 14 n.15.
71. ISRAEL, supra note 19, at 32B-33. Some have argued that restrictions on contingent valuation under
NOAA's scheme "fail[s] to hold polluters fully accountable." John H. Cushman Jr., U.S. Would Temper Oil-Spill
Damage Calculation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1994, at A9 (quoting Sarah Chasis, an attorney with the Natural

Resources Defense Council).
72. See Thompson, supra note 40, at 78 (courts have not ruled on the validity of CV studies because parties
have settled).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

the restoration (since restoration planning is a necessary component of the
evaluation methodology), and tends to be more palatable to industry.7 3
3. Current NRDA Regulations
At the same time NOAA was promulgating and defending its regulations under
the Oil Pollution Act, DOI was revamping its assessment rules in the wake of the
Ohio ruling. DOI dropped the "lesser of' rule and its earlier hierarchy of assessment
rules, while retaining the "committed use" requirement for loss of use damages.74
75
In 1996, DOI also added a "Great Lakes" model for the Type A Regulations.
76
late-1990s.
to
midthe
in
scrutiny
judicial
These revisions withstood
At present, the Type A rules provide for trustees to enter specific factual data
into either the Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine
Environments (NRDAM/CME) or the Great Lakes Environment (NRDAM/GLE).
To use either model, trustees must know the identity of the released substance, time
and duration of release, mass or volume released, location of spill, tidal and wind
conditions, extent of response actions including any beach closures or closures of
fishing or hunting areas, and a price deflator for the Gross National Product (base
year 1992)." 7
The limited utility of these Type A models should be apparent because they are
suitable only for single spills of single substances when the parameters of the spill
are known or easily ascertainable. If multiple substances are released, the models
are to be run only once for one substance. If the damages exceed $100,000, the
trustee is to limit the calculation to that amount or else use the more cumbersome
Type B rules.78 Thus, the Type A models are of no utility for Superfund sites with
commingled wastes released at different times from different responsible parties.
Type A regulations dictate a single precise methodology for their limited scope of
releases, calling for trustees only to input designated variables into a black box
model.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Type B regulations fail to dictate any
particular methodology for the remaining universe of releases, instead demanding
case-specific approaches. 79 The realm of acceptable methods within Type B
regulations to calculate damages includes several different estimating measures to
compute restoration (or replacement or equivalent) costs.8 ° Trustees add to this
amount another estimate to calculate use and non-use values of lost public services
while awaiting restoration. 8' For this second component, the trustee may draw from

73. See, e.g., Joseph P. Nicolletteet al., QuantifyingEcologicalChangesHelpsDetermineBestMitigation,
PEPE LINE &GAS INDUSTRY, Sept. 2001, at 52 (HEA method avoids overcompensating for environmental impact).
74. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,263-64, 14,268 (Mar. 25, 1994).
75. Natural Resource Damage Assessments-Type A Procedures, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,560 (May 7, 1996).
76. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 134 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding Type A
regulations); Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding
the relevant portion of Type B regulations).
77. 43 C.F.R. Pt. 11, app. 11-111 (2006).
78. Id. § 11.42.
79. Id. § 11.83(a).
80. Id. § 11.83(b).
81. Id. § 11.83(c).
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a litany of acceptable methods, including market price, appraisal, factor income,
travel cost, hedonic pricing, unit value, contingent valuation, and, as a catch-all,
"other" valuation methodologies. These are acceptable so long as they are costeffective and in accordance with the public's "willingness to pay."82 Thus, whereas
the trustee has no autonomy in Type A assessments, the same trustee enjoys
virtually unbridled flexibility in conducting Type B assessments.
Inasmuch as the D.C. Circuit has upheld Type B regulations, 3 the only
constraints on trustees wishing to enjoy the "rebuttable presumption" would appear
to be conformance to the processes mandated in the statute and the regulations
themselves. Of course, measures must comply with the regulatory restrictions
imposed by 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 for all damage determinations: they must be feasible
and reliable for a particular incident and type of damage to be measured; they must
be capable of being performed at reasonable cost; they must avoid or eliminate
double counting; and, they must be cost-effective.84 Because these regulatory
restrictions are so nebulous, however, the trustee may nevertheless remain
susceptible to challenges that the methodology selected is not cost-effective,
feasible, reliable, or suitable for the particular incident or type of damages to be
measured. This opens the door to a battle of experts in both the scientific and
economic domains, arguably eviscerating the value of the presumption.
Thus, the present scheme is deficient in a number of respects. Obviously, the
limitation on approved Type A regulations (coastal and marine only) deprives
trustees of the benefit of the simplified approach for other habitats. As a result, for
other habitats, trustees will have an uphill battle in establishing both entitlement and
amount of natural resource damages. On an even more basic level, however, the
regulatory scheme is fundamentally flawed, because the "simplified" rules are not
simple. In fact, according to a study of state natural resource trustees, even though
most cases were brought under federal authority, state trustees had devised their
own simplified assessment methods rather than using the Type A regulations.85
4. 2007 Federal Advisory Committee Recommendations
CERCLA requires that the NRD regulations be reviewed and revised as
appropriate every two years.86 Throughout the past twenty years, the collective
experience of those in the NRDA business has confirmed problems with the rules,
particularly valuation methodologies and measuring damages in dollars instead of
focusing on the restoration of both lost resources and lost service equivalents to
those resources. 87 Thus, it is clearly time to revise these regulations.

82. Id. §§ 11.83(c)(2), (3).
83. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
84. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(a)(3).
85.

AMY W. ANDO Er AL., ILL. DEP'TOFNAT. RES., NATURAL RESOURCEDAMAGEASSESSMENT: METHODS

AND CASES, 7, 10-11 (2004) [hereinafter NRDAMETHODS AND CASES], available at http://www.wmrc.uiuc.edu/
mainsections/infoservices/library-docs/RR/RR-108.pdf.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(3) (2000).
87. 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 8 ("[M]ore than twenty years of practice has shown-with few
exceptions-that restoration of injured resources can be achieved more quickly, more efficiently, and more
effectively by focusing on restoration in lieu of monetary damages, and on cooperative approaches to assessing and
addressing injury.").
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To address perceived inadequacies, a Federal Advisory Committee spent two
years collectively reviewing DOI regulations, policies, and practices regarding
Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration (NRDAR) activities." The
fruits of this labor were released in a May 2007 report containing a series of
recommendations. The committee ultimately recommended incremental correction
ranging from immediate activities (Tier 1 actions) through long-term improvements,
including revisions of the CERCLA NRDAR Regulations (Tier 3 actions).89 These
tiered recommendations are addressed in turn below.
a. Tier 1 (Immediate) Actions
The committee recommended that DOI conduct meetings, technical workshops,
and symposiums and sponsor research efforts to develop guidance on injury determination and quantification.' In addition, DOI was encouraged to promote cooperative assessments through initiatives such as model agreements with PRP groups and
creating inventories of pre-existing plans for restoration actions. The advantages of
cooperative NRD assessments are addressed in Part IV.C of this Article.
b. Tier 2 (Almost Immediate) Actions
Tier 2 actions are theoretically possible now, but are not as immediate as Tier 1
actions due to expectations that they will take longer to implement. 9' The Tier 2
recommendations seem, in many respects, to reflect the already existing NOAA
NRDA regulation processes. For example, they call for integrating National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 92 compliance into the assessment process and
developing categorical exclusions that DOI could implement simultaneously with
restoration planning.93 Most importantly, the Tier 2 recommendations would clarify
the acceptability of restoration to address compensation for lost services in addition
to basic restoration of the injured resources.9 4 To accomplish this result, the
recommendations suggest a minor regulatory change "to clarify the appropriateness
of a restoration-based approach for all natural resource damages." 95
Such a regulatory change could be quickly pursued, because it would be unlikely
to be judicially challenged. NOAA regulations to the same effect have already
passed muster.96 The committee believed these changes, like the OPA rules, (1)
comport more with an overall objective of restoration, (2) would foster an earlier
focus on restoration, and (3) would provide "flexibility to use simpler, more cost
effective, and more transparent methods to relate natural resource damage claims
to restoration, rather than monetary damages." 97

88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 18-19.

90. Id. at 18.
91. Id.
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(0 (2000).
93. Compare 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 18, with 15 C.F.R. § 990.23 (2006).
94. Compare 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 19, with 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(b), (c) ("compensatory
restoration" in addition to "primary restoration").
95. 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 18.
96. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
97. 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 16.
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The present Type A and Type B regulations require damages to be converted
from injury to dollars (valuation of damages) and back from dollars to restoration
efforts to redress the injury. One way to deal with valuation problems is to avoid
them. The NOAA approach under OPA, and the recommended change to the DOI
process, avoid the "valuation" difficulties altogether when responsible parties are
cooperatively involved and conduct the restoration activities. Even when costs of
replacement resources must be calculated, the most serious imperfections of the
present scheme are avoided.
c. Tier 3 (Longer-Term) Actions
The committee recognized that it may be necessary to rewrite some of the
regulations and that corrective actions may not be achieved overnight. "Quantifying
natural resource injury in a manner that supports reliable restoration planning can
be a highly complex, technical issue ....
[W]orkshops recommended by the Committee can help resolve some of these issues by focusing on reliable injury assessment and quantification that is clearly and transparently tied to appropriate restoration objectives." 98 The principal concerns were attempting to attain consensus-based
approaches to scientific uncertainty, clarifying threshold factors and balancing
factors to consider in evaluating proposed restoration actions, and introducing
appropriate scaling concerns to address impact on the population, habitat, or
ecosystem level. 99
Where valuation questions cannot be avoided, a transparent system based upon
credible scientific approaches could nevertheless defuse litigation. It appears the
committee values these objectives while appreciating that they may not materialize
without the time and effort of all stakeholders in the NRDA process. For example,
the committee touts President Bush's call for cooperative conservation in this regard
and its "great potential to leverage success and result in more effective, efficient,
and sustainable natural resource restoration and protection.""0 Only the future will
reveal whether these initiatives will be successful, but the regulators are not
operating in a vacuum.
Although habitat equivalency analysis "is certainly the most common single
assessment method in the current era of NRD activity, methods that place a dollar
value on [damaged natural resources] are still successfully in use."' 0 ' For example,
state trustees "employ a wide range of assessment methods, seemingly matching the
sophistication (and expense) of the method to the expected magnitude of the
damages."' 0 2 Federal cooperation with these knowledgeable stakeholders may
promote systemic changes to add appropriate tools for assessing NRDs.10 3 Section
IV.B. examines current state programs.
98. Id. at 12-13.
99. Id. at 8,11,13.
100. Id. at 10.
101. NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supranote 85, at 15.
102. Id.
103. For example, NOAA teamed with the State of Florida to streamline damage assessments to restore
seagrass habitat injured as a result of boat groundings in the Florida Keys. See Kevin D. Kirsch et al., The Mini-312
Program-An Expedited Damage Assessment and Restoration Process for Seagrasses in the Florida Keys
National Marine Sanctuary, J. COASTAL RESEARCH, Winter 2005, at 109.
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D. LitigationIssues Confronting Trustees
There are several distinct tensions underlying natural resource injury issues. The
first, precision versus simplicity, is encompassed within the valuation choice itself.
It was addressed above in terms of the trustees' choice to follow an approved
NRDA regulation in calculating damages, or to choose simpler, but less "litigationworthy" assessment strategies. Because simplified assessment strategies are more
promising as options for promoting settlement than as stepping stones toward
litigation, these possibilities are explained more fully in Section IV.C.
One notable exception to the tension between precision and simplicity is the
restoration method of assessment. This methodology values the cost of performing
restoration in kind, both to restore injuries to baseline and as a surrogate for
monetizing lost service costs. These methodologies, as embraced by the NOAA
regulations and under consideration for DOI regulation revisions, actually simplify
the NRD process while also requiring precision. The tension between simplicity and
precision is eased because charges for "in-kind" activities are more clearly linked
to market-based restoration cost versus monetary damages for each resource injury.
Restoration methodology utilizes estimates that are derived from habitat
equivalency analysis, which is grounded on real world corrective measures. For
instance, only the restoration equivalence for lost resources, including lost service
values, needs to be translated into equivalent corrective action costs. Furthermore,
assessing the substitute restoration costs avoids the double conversion problem of
first forcing an initial dollar-value determination of injuries and then later
translating the costs recovered for these injuries into a concrete restoration plan.
Therefore, there are two simplification gains--one in the substance of the
calculation, and the second in the procedure to complete the actual restoration
activity, because the assessment itself already selects the solution.
The trustee need not monetize restoration costs at all-only impose restoration
obligations and ensure that they are executed. If forced to put a dollar figure on the
assessment, trustees will not monetize the costs until they have already defined all
of the corrective actions. Therefore, planning is "built-in" and all that remains is the
execution of the restoration plan. This benefits the environment by (1) fostering
more rapid restoration, (2) enhancing opportunities for settlement by avoiding the
obstacle of putting a dollar value on damages, and (3) affording trustees a more
defensible°4litigation position, as Congress and the courts prefer restoration to
damages.'
In addition to valuation, trustees are confronted with two more critical choices:
deciding to pursue the claim sooner or later and deciding whether to pursue the
claim using state law,' 0 5 CERCLA, or some combination of both federal and state
causes of action. "Nothing in [CERCLA] shall affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State law, including
104. See Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (DC. Cir. 1989); Gen. Elec. I11,
467 F.3d
1223, 1249-52 (10th Cir. 2006).
105. See generally ISRAEL, supra note 19 § 32B.12, at 32B-1 18 (state by state review of NRD programs);
Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin M. Ward, Natural Resource Damages: Recovery Under State Law Compared with
FederalLaw, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,134 (1990).
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common law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants
or contaminants."" 6 Furthermore, nothing in CERCLA preempts any State "from
imposing any additional liability or requirements
with respect to the release of
' 10 7
hazardous substances within such State."
Where state resources are affected, the state trustee "may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law."' 0 8 As master of the claim, the trustee
wishing to rely on state law must ensure pleadings are artfully drafted so as not to
raise a CERCLA issue on their face." ° The question of jurisdiction is slightly
different from the question concerning conflict preemption (which itself may be
decided within the state courts). 110 Recently, federal judges considering this precise
issue, in the context of state law actions for natural resource damages, have allowed
properly pleaded complaints to go forward in the state courts, even where the issue
of compatibility of the state remedy with CERCLA was being litigated."'
Although the main thrust of the CERCLA NRD scheme entails trustees assessing
and imposing NRDs, a number of ancillary concerns may also be important to the
litigation posture of the case, the magnitude of recoverable NRDs, or both. Thus,
they have become the focus of some concern to both trustees and the PRPs.
One litigation concern is the limitation on liability "for each release" found in
CERCLA Section 107(c)." 2 This section caps liability for most polluters to "the
total of all costs of response plus $50,000,000 for any damages under this
subchapter.""' 3 This language appears to limit the exposure for natural resource
damages for ordinary polluters to a maximum of fifty million dollars. Case law,
however, indicates that this cap is largely illusory. "' The courts have construed the
wording "for each release" broadly to avoid the $50,000,000 liability limit in
situations involving multiple or continuing releases. 115
Another point of contention is the timing of the pollution giving rise to NRD
liability. The statute provides no recovery "where such damages and the release of
a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly
'
before December 11, 1980."116
Like the example above, a close reading of the
language (here, the words "damages" and "wholly before") has kept the door open
for trustees to treat continuing releases as outside the scope of the limitation."1 7 For
example, due to leaching or other methods of delayed exposure to natural resources,

106. 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (2000).
107. Id. § 9614(a).
108. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Minn. Mining& Mfg. Co., No. 06-2612,2007 WL 2027916, at *2 (D.N.J.
July 5, 2007) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
109. See id.
110. See id. at *2-3.
111. See id. at *6; see also N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 06-401, 2006 WL
2806231, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2006).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1) (2000).
113. Id. § 9607(d). The most significant exception is that the cap does not apply for circumstances of willful
misconduct or willful negligence leading to the release, nor for polluters who fail to cooperate with authorities in
the cleanup. Id. § 9607(c)(2).
114. United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 835 F. Supp. 534, 542 (1993).
115. Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
117. Montrose, 835 F. Supp. at 542.
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either the pollution is continuing until the resources are damaged or the damages are
continuing after the statutory trigger."'
The three-year statute of limitations for NRD recovery" 9 has been similarly
construed to the disadvantage of polluters. For example, the "clock starts ticking"
on the later of "(A) The date of the discovery of the loss and its connection with the
release in question. [Or] (B) The date
on whichfinal regulationsarepromulgated
120
under section 9651(c) of this title."'
The courts have allowed a continuing release to extend to the discovery of new
damages to the environment not earlier detected.'12 In that event, the later discovery
starts the clock ticking. 22 Also, it is routine practice when contamination is first
discovered and the parties are in the remedial investigation stage to enter into a
tolling agreement concerning the NRDs.'2 3 The tolling agreement helps a proactive
PRP, since aggressive cleanup will reduce the lingering NRDs that need to be
restored. Calculating the damages at a point before cleanup has begun would be
premature and not based upon the better evidence of actual harm likely to be
available later.
Another complicating factor that will at least delay imposition of NRDs, but may
also give some leverage to polluters trying to settle, is the interplay required
between state and federal trustees. 124 State trustees desiring to maintain a more
favorable business environment may be more conservative in their estimates of
NRDs than their federal counterparts, while state trustees more interested in
complete restoration of the injured environment may be more zealous than federal
trustees.
These tensions between trustees may arise in cases moving toward litigation as
well as cases working their way toward settlement. PRPs must be prudent and
secure a release from the relevant state and federal NRD
trustees so that the
25
covenant not to sue clearly extends to all NRD claims.

118. See, e.g., In re Alleged PCB Pollution of Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 716 F. Supp. 676,
685-86 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding that where pollution is divisible no recovery may be had for release before
December 11, 1980, but where indivisible entire amount of damages, both earlier and later, may be imposed).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. California v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 104 F.3d 1507, 1512 (9th Cir. 1997).
122. Id.
123. Such a tolling agreement with the trustee is discussed explicitly in GeneralElectricIII: "Consistent with
his duties under CERCLA...New Mexico's NRT entered into tolling agreements with several PRPs, including GE,
the USAF, and US DOE, to delay a CERCLA-based NRD lawsuit while he attempted to negotiate a settlement of
the State's NRD claims." 467 F.3d 1223, 1235 (10th Cir. 2006).
124. CERCLA Section 111(i) requires:
Except in a situation requiring action to avoid an irreversible loss of natural resources or to
prevent or reduce any continuing danger to natural resources or similar need for emergency
action, funds may not be used under this chapter for the restoration, rehabilitation, or
replacement or acquisition of the equivalent of any natural resources until a planfor the use of
suchfunds for such purposes has been developed and adoptedby affected Federalagencies

and the Governor or Governors of any State having sustaineddamage to natural resources
within its borders, belonging to, managed by or appertaining to such State, and by the governing
body of any Indian tribe having sustained damageto natural resources belonging to, managed
by, controlled by, or appertaining to such tribe....
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (i) (emphasis added).
125. CERCLA requires that a consent decree be entered in the appropriate U.S. District Court, and the Court
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SARA crafted a new settlement section to allow CERCLA closure to encompass
NRDs, so long as the trustees have been consulted and concur. 126 An agreement may
contain a covenant not to sue for natural resource damages to the United States
"only if the Federal natural resource trustee has agreed in writing to such
covenant." 2 7 This agreement must be predicated upon restoration by the potentially
responsible party, in addition to "appropriate actions necessary to protect and
restore the natural resources
damaged by such release or threatened release of
' 28
hazardous substances."'
A final concern for PRPs entering natural resource damage settlements is that
many such settlements may allow future additional claims for damages. 29 In the
Exxon Valdez case, for example, the civil settlement included a reopener provision
that allowed the trustees to come back, within fifteen years, for up to 100 million
additional dollars. 30 In 2006, the United States and Alaska trustees announced that
they would seek another ninety-two million dollars from Exxon (now Exxon Mobil)
to address additional injuries not apparent at the time of settlement. 3 '
The Clean Water Act' 3 2 and Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 33 also afford opportunities
for NRDs. 13" These regimes are considered here only to the extent that they suggest
problems or solutions for CERCLA NRDs. They differ from CERCLA most notably
in that they cover petroleum related spills, whereas CERCLA does not. One distinct
advantage when dealing with oil spills and petroleum pollution is that the effects of
these pollutants have already been heavily investigated.' 35 In contrast, there are
"close to or over 100,000 industrial chemicals that are on the market today,"' 136

must evaluate whether the decree is fair and reasonable. United States v. Brook Village Assocs., No. Civ A 05-195,
2006 WL 3227769 at * 1 (D.R.I. Nov. 6, 2006). Likewise, the involvement of state trustees is necessary to foreclose
their interest in later pursuing CERCLA NRDs or other analogous state law remedies. See id. at *3 (The Rhode
Island housing authority consented to a decree given defendants' tenuous financial condition, while EPA agreed
because defendants purchased already contaminated property, did not contribute further to pollution, and operated
much needed public housing projects.)
126. 42 U.S.C. §9622(j)(1) states:
Where a release or threatened release of any hazardous substance that is the subject of
negotiations under this section may have resulted in damages to natural resources under the
trusteeship of the United States, the President shall notify the Federal natural resource trustee
of the negotiations and shall encourage the participation of such trustee in the negotiations.
127. Id.§ 9622 0)(2).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill--Civil Settlement "Reopener," available
at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/StoreAuth.cfm?doc=/Store/Event-Documentstreopener.interior.fact%20sheet.pdf.
130. Id. The settlement provided that additional liability only attached where the original damages were
insufficient to redress the injury, natural resources continued to suffer, and loss or decline could not have been
anticipated at the time of settlement. Id.
131. Joint Press Release, Department of Justice & State of Alaska Department of Law, United States and the
State of Alaska Seeking Additional Funds from ExxonMobil for Continuing Natural Resource Damages Caused
by 1989 Oil Spill (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/StoreAuth.cfm?doc=/Store/ Event_
Documents/SAK-DOIPressRelease.pdf.
132. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
133. Id.§§ 2701-2761.
134. See id. § 1321 (CWA NRD provision); Id. § 2706 (OPA NRD provision).
135. For example, after the Exxon Valdez disaster 51 damage assessment studies were conducted, including
a controversial study involving the killing of 219 seabirds, immersing them in oil, and then tracking their drift
patterns. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RCED-92-22, NATURAL RESOURcES DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
INFORMATION ON STUDY OF SEABIRDS KILLED BY EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 2 (1991).

136. Milo Mason, Interview: Stephen L Johnson, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT., Fall 2006, at 61.
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presenting scientists with unprecedented challenges in defining aggregate and
cumulative impacts on the environment and her creatures.' 37
Unlike oils spills under OPA and point source discharges under the Clean Water
Act, other types of discharges are more challenging to assess. Under CERCLA there
is usually no "smoking gun" readily identifying the perpetrator, nor is there as well
defined a consequence on the natural environment when contaminants ooze and
seep into soil and groundwater over time, as when there is an immediate consequence emerging from the release. These complicating factors under CERCLA may
in part explain why the giant has been sleeping.
MH.
HOW NOT TO PURSUE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES
A. New Mexico Case Study
1. Site History and Scope of CERCLA Clean-up Efforts
The "South Valley" site is located about two and one-half miles south of downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico.' 3 8 It is an industrial area, as well as host to
petroleum processing and distribution networks, and "has been the site of
manufacturing operations since at least 1948.' ' 3
In 1951, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) acquired property in the South
4°
Valley and constructed a facility to manufacture nuclear weapons components."
AEC's contractor, American Car and Foundry (ACF), operated this governmentowned facility and "engaged in machining of metal parts, plating, welding and other
activities" until the Air Force took over the property in 1967.'14
The Air Force converted the factory into a production facility for aircraft engine
parts. This manufacturing plant (Plant 83) was operated by General Electric (GE)
for over fifteen years under a series of contracts and leases with the Air Force
before GE's subsidiary (General Electric Aircraft Engines) acquired it outright
in
42
1984. The facility continues to manufacture aircraft engine components. 1
A number of other industrial facilities also operated in the South Valley. Most
notable of these were "petroleum product pipeline and bulk distribution facilities
operated by Chevron, Texaco, and others."' 4 3 The South Valley was also home to
an industrial chemical distribution facility owned and operated by Univar.'"
In 1979, chemical analysis of an Albuquerque water supply well in the South
Valley detected the presence of hazardous substances in the groundwater. 4 '
Contamination emanating from the South Valley included a number of volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) unquestionably within the CERCLA definition of
137. EPA Administrator Stephen L. Johnson explained in an interview published in the fall of 2006 that "a
decade ago we did not have the scientific wherewithal to do aggregate assessment or cumulative assessment." Id.
According to Johnson, "We've cleaned up literally thousands of sites across the United States." Id. at 60.
138. Gen. Elec. I1, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1192 (D.N.M. 2004).
139. Id. at 1192-93.
140. Id. at 1192.
141. id.
142. Id. at 1192-93.
143. Id.at 1193.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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hazardous substances. 4 6 The water also contained significant pollution from
petroleum-based products beyond the scope of CERCLA.'4 7
As a result of the contamination, the State identified the South Valley as its top
priority hazard and requested that EPA place it on the National Priority List for
cleanup under CERCLA.'48 EPA's initial remedy included replacing the tainted
drinking water well with a new well outside the zone of contamination.' 49 This
remedy complied with 40 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix D, as an acceptable remedial
response to groundwater contamination, and "the State 'of150 New Mexico requested
this measure and... agree[d] with the approved remedy."
Subsequent remediation included pumping and treating contaminated groundwater in both the upper and lower aquifers below the site to extract over 1400
pounds of VOCs. The remediation plan also created a hydraulic barrier to prevent
further spreading of the contaminant plume.' 5' To date, over 4.5 billion gallons of
water have been treated and returned to the aquifers for beneficial use.'52
2. Pre-trial Posturing/Forum Selection'53
On October 1, 1999, Patricia Madrid, the New Mexico Attorney General (AG),
filed a CERCLA NRD claim against federal and private party defendants in the
federal district court of New Mexico. 54
' She simultaneously filed a complaint in the
Second Judicial District Court of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, for damages
under state law against the same PRPs, excluding the federal agencies. 55 GE and
ACF sought and obtained removal
of the cases for consolidation with the pending
56
federal CERCLA NRD cases.
Madrid lacked the trustee's support when she initially filed suit, and the trustee
was named as an involuntary plaintiff. 157 This put the trustee, Bill Turner, in the
precarious position of opposing the State whose resources he was charged to
protect. Turner risked possibly being called as a hostile witness.
The conflict also put the AG in a tenuous position. She conceded that she had no
authority to file the federal lawsuit until she decided that "Turner was imperiling
146. Gen. Elec. II, 467 F.3d 1223, 1232 n.15 (10th Cir. 2006). The six detected VOCs were "(1) 1,1dichloroethane (1,I-DCA), (2) 1,1-dichloroethene (I,I-DCE), (3) 1,2-dichloroethane (1,2-DCA), (4)
trichloroethylene (TCE), (5) tetrachloroethylene (perchloroethylene, PCE), and (6) vinyl chloride (VC)." Id.
147. See id. at 1233 n.18 (describing state-negotiated hydrocarbon remediation agreements with PRPs for
petroleum-related discharges).
148. Id. at 1227 & n.4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2000), which gives authority to States to identify priority
sites for listing on the NPL).
149. Gen. Elec. 11,
335 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
150. Gen. Elec. 111,
467 F.3d at 1228 (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 1232.
152. Id. at 1233. "T7he cost of the remedial activity has been shared among GE, the Air Force and the United
States Department of Energy (for the AEC): nine percent of the cost was allocated to General Electric, 43.2 percent
was allocated to the Department of Energy, and 47.8 percent was allocated to the Air Force, based on the relative
duration of land ownership." Gen. Elec. 11,
335 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 n.5.
153. For a more detailed description of the tortured procedural history of the case, see Gen. Elec. 1, 335 F.
Supp. 2d 1157, 1160-69 (D.N.M. 2003).
154. Gen. Elec. 1, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1161.
157. lan Hoffman, Trustee, AG Go to Court: Justicesto Decide Legal Standoff, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 22,
2000, at Al.
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the state's potential case against the polluters and [thereby] violating his role as
trustee for the state and the environment."' l s In effect, because she felt Turner was
not executing his NRD duties as required by law, Madrid was asserting the
authority of the State to step in and advocate on behalf of its people.
The AG' s actions raised, as a matter of first impression, an important standing
question as to whether anyone other than the trustee, the official designated by law,
could bring such actions. The standing question was first addressed by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, which affirmed Madrid's authority to represent the State. 5' 9
Later, in the federal court, Judge Jenkins noted, "[1]t appears to me all the necessary
parties, including the trustee, are here."'" The next day, the trustee agreed to
cooperate with the AG's lawyers in the suit. 6 '
After three years of pleadings, discovery, and motion practice, the case was
scheduled for a final pretrial conference in the fall of 2002.162 Some details of the
evolution of the case during this phase are instructive for anyone seeking to keep
state law issues from being consolidated with and removed to federal court:
Since commencing this action in October of 1999, the Plaintiffs have been
creative in the number and kind of theories of liability they have pleaded and
argued in this action. The Defendants in turn have proven resourceful in
responding to the Plaintiffs'
claims, propounding an array of legal theories and
16
factual assertions.

1

The AG had acquiesced to federal jurisdiction"6 and filed a consolidated

complaint pleading both CERCLA and state law claims "in one action, based upon
identical factual allegations."' 165 By the end of the first week of the pretrial
conference, however,
plaintiffs' expansive damages theories-initially seeking a recovery of over $4

billion-had been significantly reduced by paring out remote and speculative
claims for lost tax revenues and diminished property values, the 'replacement
cost' of substituting a surface reservoir for an entire groundwater aquifer, along

with legally deficient claims for punitive damages."
After these rulings, New Mexico renewed its motion to remand the remaining issues
to state court, simultaneously moving to dismiss their
pending CERCLA claims, and
67
the federal defendants, from the pending action.

158. Id.
159. Guillermo Contreras & Wren Propp, Trustee, AG Join Forces in Cleanup Suit, ALBUQUERQUE J., July

28, 2000, at Dl.
160. Id. (the day after the federal court decision, the trustee upon order of the Governor agreed to work with
the AG).
161. Id.; see also Leslie Hoffman, Trustee on Boardwith AG Lawsuit, ALBUQUERQUETRIB., July 28, 2000,
atA3.
162. Gen. Elec. II, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1197 (D.N.M. 2004).

163. Id. at 1200. As of January 2004, "the pleadings, motions and other papers filed in this action exceeded
thirty-seven shelffeet of files in the Clerk's Office, and more filings have since been received." Id.
164. See Gen. Elec. 1, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-66.
165. See id. at 1166.

166. Id. at 1169.
167. Id.
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On November 20, 2002, after the pretrial conference resumed, the court dismissed plaintiffs' CERCLA claims. 6 At the same time, an onerous year and a half
after the complaint had been filed, the State also dismissed the federal defendants
with prejudice. 69 This left only state law claims that were not inconsistent with
CERCLA to go forward against the remaining defendants. 70 CERCLA explicitly
allows non-preclusion of such claims 7' while prohibiting "double recovery
of
172
damages under both CERCLA and other federal or state law theories."'
3. Decisions on the Merits
In New Mexico v. General Electric Co., the district court struggled with three
fundamental issues: "(1) What is the nature of the State's interest in the
groundwater underlying the South Valley Site? (2) How has that interest been
injured, and as measured by what standard? [and,]
(3) What is the appropriate
73
measure of damages to compensate that injury?"'
a. The State's Interest in Groundwater and the Aquifer
In addressing the first issue, the court agreed that New Mexico had an interest in
protecting groundwater on behalf of its people as a matter of public trust. The court,
however, found that there was no proof in the record that the State owned any water
rights in the South Valley, nor that any water rights holder had lost the use of any
volume of water.' 74 In other words, while the State had standing to seek these loss
of use damages on behalf of its people, there was no proof of any injury.
The court further concluded, "[aibsent proof of some possessory ownership
interest in land at the South Valley Site-title to the surface or subsurface estate,
a reservation of minerals, or the like-the State has no legally cognizable interest
in the aquifer beneath the South Valley Site."1 75 The court also held "storage for the
sake of storage alone is not a beneficial use under New Mexico law, particularly
where future use is nothing more than speculative with respect to the beneficial

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Gen. Elec. I1,
335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1222 (D.N.M. 2004). The State alleged the following causes of
action: "(1) common-law trespass; (2) common-law public nuisance; (3) statutory public nuisance... (pollution of
drinking water); and (4) common-law negligence." Id.
171. The savings clause in 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (2000) provides, "[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed
or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the
release of hazardous substances within such State." 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) further provides that "[n]othing in this
chapter shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State
law, including common law, with respect to the releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or
contaminants." Of course, "CERCLA does preempt the application of state or local law to hazardous waste
contamination where the state or local law is in actual conflict with CERCLA or with a remedial order issued by
the EPA." Gen. Elec. 11,
335 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
172. Gen. Elec. 11,
335 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. Notably, one of New Mexico's claims was for "those damages
incurred in excess of the damage limitation as provided by 42 U.S.C. 9607(c)." Id. at 1223 (quoting Plantiffs'
Consolidated Complaint). The $50,000,000 cap is discussed infra at notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
173. Gen. Elec. 11,
335 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
174. See id. at 1200-03, 1214-15.
175. Id. at 1205.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

'
uses."176
Plaintiffs thus had no legal footing for their damages claim based upon
injury to the aquifer itself.'

b. Harm to State's Interest and Appropriate Standard to Define Harm
The State asserted that "ongoing remediation activities... [would not] restore the8
contaminated groundwater to its pristine, pre-contaminated, 'baseline' condition."17
New Mexico further alleged that the water would not be useable as drinking water
and, therefore, the cost of drinking water-the highest and best use of the
resource-was the appropriate measure of damages.' 79 While the initial proposition
was likely true (the pump and treat system would reduce, but not erase,
contamination), the other assertions were unfounded.
New Mexico drinking water standards required only that public water systems
supply drinking water that meets the EPA's Maximum Contaminant Levels
(MCLs).' 80 These standards, expressly adopted by the State of New Mexico,
complied with all state and federal requirements to ensure a safe water supply for
that meets those same
consumption.' Thus, "[i]t follows that groundwater
182
water."'
drinking
as
use
to
lost
been
not
has
standards
While the State was certainly free to promulgate regulations to set more
protective limits,"' it could not complain that any use was lost under the facts of
this case. 84 Had New Mexico adopted more stringent MCL standards, the court
would conceivably have been able to compare the quality of the water after
remediation with these drinking water standards.' 85 However, the fact that a
replacement well had been installed as part of the86initial CERCLA response would
have foreclosed such an argument in any event.
Finally, even if the remediated water did not meet the State's drinking water
standards, the State would have had to prove that the water was essential for
drinking-its highest and best use-or that there was no other beneficial use of the
water for lesser purposes. 187 The Tenth Circuit's hierarchy of uses approach

176. Id. at 1202-03 n.29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id. at 1205.
178. Id.
179. Id. The State alleged that it had been "prevented from allowing its citizens the benefit of this natural
resource. Further, even after said remediation, the natural resource will remain in an impaired state, unusable and/or
nonpotable, and unfit for human consumption." Id. (quotations omitted).
180. Id.at 1210.
181. Id. (citing 20.7.10.1 etseq. NMCA).
182. Id.
183. A more protective measure would have been consistent with the overall goals of the Safe Drinking Water
Act and could readily be harmonized with the federal scheme as well as the State's interest in safeguarding its
populace.
184. Gen. Elec. 11, 335 F. Supp. 2dat 1211.
185. Such an argument would still be subject to proof of actual contaminant levels after remediation. In
addition, such an argument is largely theoretical, because CERCLA already requires cleanup to a tighter standard
as an "Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement" (ARAR). ARARs, integrating state law where it is
more protective, are built in as requirements during remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) and remedy
selection. To the extent the standards are technologically feasible, they will be required. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.5,

300.400(g)(4) (2007).
186. Gen. Elec. ll, 467 F.3d 1223, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006) (when the new well was placed in operation, New

Mexico "acquired the equivalent" of the natural resources it lost when the contaminated well was decommissioned).
335 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
187. Gen. Elec. 11,
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imposes a burden on the plaintiff to establish what use was actually lost in
calculating the damages for such a loss. This method serves the same function of
reducing speculation, but in a different formulation than the "committed use"
standard of the DOI regulations.' 88
B. Flaws with the New Mexico Approach
Looking at the big picture, the ideal way to litigate a natural resource damages
case is with the support of the natural resource trustee(s), after conducting a proper
NRDA in accordance with the duly promulgated regulations. This would create a
rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trustee that assessed damages are correct.
New Mexico chose a more challenging approach that introduced insurmountable
burdens.
1. No Coordination or Support of the Trustee
When the New Mexico Attorney General, Patricia Madrid, brought the NRD
case, she disagreed with the State's NRD trustee, Bill Turner, over the damages, and
indeed whether they were even ripe to pursue. 189 Madrid "decided she had a better
plan to benefit the public treasury, and, at least in the opinion of some, usurped the
authority of the State's [Natural Resources Trustee]."' 90 According to trustee Bill
Turner, "The lawsuit really puts the State in a much weaker position than if she had
allowed me to do the work. If the defendants want to file for dismissal, I'll support
it, [t]hen I'll do the damage assessment."'91 Hindsight proves that Turner's position
was correct.
The trustee's endorsement is essential even if given reluctantly or under duress.
Although Turner ultimately capitulated and agreed to support the AG's case, had
Turner not agreed to support the lawsuit, Madrid had indicated she would petition
the State Supreme Court for his removal. 192 It is difficult to imagine a court
awarding a sum not endorsed by the trustee when the trustee is the authorized
official to determine the damages under CERCLA. The Department of Justice
would presumably insist upon no less when litigating an NRD case involving the
federal government, rather than risk the respective trustee experts impeaching each
other's testimony.
While this case affords an extreme example of lack of cooperation, it is not hard
to imagine other scenarios where there might be a lack of coordination among
trustees. State and Federal Trustees may well disagree about the magnitude of
damages. For example, after the lower Fox River had been contaminated by
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from local paper companies, the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) settled the case for seven million dollars
at a time when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) estimated natural

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
Ian Hoffman, State AG Sues 15 Alleged Polluters, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 2, 1999, at Al.
Gen. Elec. 111, 467 F.3d at 1242.
Hoffman, supranote 189.
Contreras & Propp, supra note 159.
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resources damages to be between $176 million and $333 million. 193 Notably, there
was no disagreement about the scope of the damage itself, yet the projected costs
varied so widely that the estimates did not even overlap.
194
One difficulty with CERCLA NRDs is that there may be "too many cooks."'
Under OPA, NOAA has clear authority to regulate NRDs, and consensus is comparatively easy.' 95 From their inception, NOAA regulations included a cooperative
approach.196 DOI has, through its 4Cs policy (Conservation through Consultation,
Cooperation, and Communication), embraced a similar insistence upon trustee
coordination.' 97 "These partnerships have proven very beneficial for all involved,
as cooperation and consultation among the trustees facilitates addressing overlapp98
ing areas of trustee concern, and consolidates those concerns into a single case."1
2. No Assessment of Damages
In the South Valley case, even though the trustee was ultimately on-board for the
litigation, he had never arrived at a figure for damages through the NRDA process.' 99 Thus, the AG's lawsuit was both premature and speculative. Both aspects
merit some attention.
New Mexico put the cart before the horse, suing for $260 million and later
alleging multi-billion dollar damages without having first conducted an NRDA in
accordance with CERCLA. The lack of detailed support (also known as proof or
evidence) was painfully evident from the beginning, when plaintiffs had no calculations or methodology to support their damage figure. 2" The underdeveloped nature
of the asserted liability could also easily be surmised from the vacillating nature of
the demand. Finally, this approach contravened the CERCLA directive that "State
officials shall assess damages to natural resources.. .under their trusteeship." '' The
State of New Mexico ignored that principle when commencing litigation without
an NRDA.
The speculative nature of New Mexico's demand stems irrevocably from its
premature assertion. Damages may not be assessed before they are ascertained, and
the NRDA is the instrument for ascertaining the damages. 20 2 Although this flaw is

193. Peter Rebhaun, Feds Plan to Presson with PCB DamagePlan,GREEN BAY PRESs-GAZETTE, Nov. 21,
2000, at 1B.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Asarco, Inc., No. CV96-0122-N-EJL, CV91 -342-N-EJL, 1998 WL 1799392
at *1, *5 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 1998) (some defendants had settled with state and tribal trustees but not the other
federal trustees).
195. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2706(d)-(e) (2000). "If a range of assessment procedures providing the same type and
quality of information is available, the most cost-effective procedure must be used." 15 C.F.R. § 990.27(c)(2)
(2008).
196. 15 C.F.R. § 990.14 (2008).
197.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION PROGRAM

FIScAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS 2, 17, http://restoration.doi.gov/pdf/greenbook07.pdf [hereinafter
DOI 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS].
198. Id. at 17. The National Contingency Plan also contemplates such cooperation. See 40 C.F.R. §
300.615(a) (2007).
199. Gen. Elec. I11, 467 F.3d 1223, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006).
200. See id.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B) (2000).
202. See supra Part B.C.
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easy to identify and understand, the ability to cure this defect creates a conundrum
for NRD trustees.
Unless the trustees expend considerable time and effort (not to mention the cost
of expensive studies and expert analysis), they cannot hope to have a monetary
valuation of damages that will withstand judicial scrutiny. The paucity of NRD
litigation has simply made the evidentiary bar uncertain.2 3 New Mexico's flawed
litigation proves this point.2 °4 The AG's "too little too late" assessment efforts met
with no success, and the hurdles she encountered, coupled with the ultimate holding, provide powerful circumstantial evidence of the value of the rebuttable
presumption.
3. Difficult to Prove Damages Without a Presumption
A presumption in favor of NRD's is favorable. The Tenth Circuit noted it was
well aware that NRD assessment is a costly proposition.... Still, given the AG's
original multi-billion dollar claim against GE and ACF, a few million dollars
seems not so significant a cost to take advantage of CERCLA's rebuttable
presumption of NRDs, especially where the reasonable costs of assessment are
recoverable from PRPs.2 °5
In fact, perhaps at least part of the reason NRDs have not taken off originates in
the uphill battle of sustaining an NRD case without the benefit of this presumption.2" 6 The Tenth Circuit cast the challenge in the following manner:
Without any CERCLA-based NRD assessment to rely on.. .the State undertook
the arduous task of proving as an initial matter natural resources injury outside
the intended scope of a comprehensive, CERCLA-mandated remediation. The
State also confronted the problem of restrictions which both CERCLA and the
NRTA [New Mexico's "Natural Resources Trustee Act"2 7] impose upon the
measure of damages even supposing some redressable injury remains.20 8
Following the NRD regulations may present significant hurdles of its own, 2°9 but
if the other circuits follow the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, it may be virtually
impossible to recover without the power of the presumption. In effect, whether or
not the trustee enjoys the presumption may de facto become determinative in the
face of otherwise speculative damages.
4. Valuation Pitfalls
The Tenth Circuit decision shows the modem-day vitality of the preference for
restoration in lieu of money damages and is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's

203. See Thompson, supra note 40, at 57.
204. See supra Part IH.A.
205. Gen. Elec. 111, 467 F.3d at 1242 n.28 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(C), (f)(2)(C) (2000)).
206. See id. (citing Gina M. Lambert & Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA's Natural Resource
DamagesProvision:Incorporationof the Public Trust Doctrine into NaturalResource Damage Actions, 11 VA.
ENvT. L.J. 353, 371-72 (1992)).
207. NMSA 1978, §§ 75-7-1 to 75-7-5 (2007).
208. Gen. Elec. 11, 467 F.3d at 1242.
209. See supra Part H.C.
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holding in Ohio v. UnitedStates Departmentofthe Interiorthat Congress preferred
"restoration cost as the measure of recovery in natural resource damage cases."2 ' 0
Trustees that favor restoration projects and substitute resources for those that were
damaged also create pathways to settlement with the responsible parties. This may,
in part, explain the success of the New Jersey approach discussed in Part IV. In
addition, the Tenth Circuit's opinion sheds light on several valuation pitfalls
trustees would be advised to avoid.
a. Account for Remediation in Mitigating Damage Claims
New Mexico ignored the success of the groundwater remediation in restoring the
aquifer in the South Valley to meet safe drinking water standards.2 1' Since cleanup
improves the environment, the extent of damages remaining is necessarily
predicated on the effectiveness of the remediation itself. Therefore, the trustee must
properly account for the success of remedial measures in any NRD claim. If
unwilling or unable to wait until remediation is complete (when the scope of
remaining injury becomes positively determinable), the trustee must estimate the
effectiveness of the cleanup and remaining injuries to the satisfaction of the court.
Determining the lingering injury or loss of resources necessitates a case-by-case
analysis. One must evaluate the underlying assumptions, their factual predicates,
and the logical inference chain. These theoretical parameters should then be fit to
the natural habitats contaminated, the corresponding response of the affected
environment to individual or multiple pollutants, and the means and costs of
restoration.
Confounding this analysis is the notion that when cleanup is incomplete, the
court must use its crystal ball to examine the assumptions and assertions contained
in plaintiffs predicted "future world." Thus, the court is put in the position of
comparing and contrasting these assumptions with defendant's contentions of the
probable efficacy of ongoing remediation. In other words, part of the daunting task
is to answer CERCLA's central mystery: How clean is clean? Speculation and best
guessing by the parties and the court as to the effectiveness of the remediation
provides some clue, albeit an imperfect answer. 2
Such forecasting in the face of incomplete remediation analysis is no easy task
in a situation such as the South Valley site. There, remediation was on a thirty-year
track, but there was every indication that it would take longer if the remediation
failed to meet standards to sufficiently protect human health and the environment.2 13
In this regard, CERCLA has a requirement for five-year reviews following adoption
of the Record of Decision, so that the government may insist upon additional
protective measures if necessary.2 14

210. 880 F.2d 432, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
211. Gen. Elec. III, 467 F.3d at 1249.
212. The CERCLA Record of Decision (ROD) may aid in the analysis, as the cleanup remedy will be selected
based upon its projected ability to eliminate the risks posed by the pollution, but the ROD is itself forward-looking
based upon the projected effectiveness of the remedial action.
213. Gen. Elec. 1II, 467 F.3d at 1229.
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c) (2000).
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In the groundwater domain, the combination of Applicable or Relevant and
Appropriate Requirements (ARARs)21 5 and these five-year reviews could foreclose
any remaining injury to drinking water at the completion of the remedial effort. As
in the New Mexico case, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 216 and parallel state
laws require cleaning the aquifer to the maximum contaminant levels (MCLs)
authorized in the SDWA. Since this "risk-based" remediation already restores the
water to its "highest and best use," there can be no lingering loss of use injury. In
other words, remediation equals restoration of drinking water.
Even though the water may be safe to drink, however, it will not likely be
restored to baseline. This is regrettable for the environment (at least insofar as
tainted resources will always be closer to the MCLs than the resources were before
they were polluted). In this sense, what is lost is the absorptive capacity of the water
body to assimilate later pollution. Nevertheless, this damage is non-compensable
as there is no way to value this lost assimilative capacity. In any event, the SDWA
standard is a useful barometer because a subsequent polluter would be forced to
clean up to the same standard. In that case, the MCLs would be both the legal and
factual baseline for damages. But again, if remediation is successful, there will be
no need for restoration.
When remediation cures any drinking water deficiency, the only potential
damages remaining are for loss of use of the drinking water as a resource while the
remediation is ongoing. The New Mexico District Court and the Tenth Circuit read
lost use damages extremely narrowly. For example, even when a resource was
actually being used at the time contamination was detected, the courts held that the
public had suffered no deprivation because the CERCLA response effort itself
afforded a substitute for the lost or injured resources. 7 This is exactly what
happened in New Mexico when the tainted water
supply well was closed and
2 18
replaced with a new clean drinking water well.
CERCLA requirements for removal actions, however, will always necessitate a
substitute drinking water source. This is because drinking water toxins above the
maximum contaminant level pose a per se risk to human health.2" 9 The entire
National Contingency Plan (through the national response center and the network
of state and local emergency response agencies) is designed to afford this safe
contingency, so that the public is not exposed to environmental risk.22 °
CERCLA already affords remedies for substitute emergency resources because
the polluter pays for the removal action, so this aspect of natural resource damages
is properly carved out of NRDs. To the extent the polluting party has already paid,
it should not have to pay double. Once viewed from this perspective, the New
Mexico v. GeneralElectricapproach is not draconian because the PRPs had already
paid for the cost of installing the replacement well as part of the cleanup. However,
215. See id.; 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.5,300.400(g)(4) (2007).
216. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300fto 300j-26 (2000).
217. See Gen. Elec. II1, 467 F.3d at 1252.
218. Id.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2000) (establishing MCLs); id. § 300i (emergency power to order alternative water
supply); id. § 9601(23) (alternative water supplies as part of CERCLA removal); see also id. § 9618 (highest
priority for drinking water supplies).
220. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415 (2007).
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in future scenarios, trustees should seek to recover similar costs where the state or
federal government has provided substitute drinking water.
b. Account for Alternative Uses of Tainted Resources
Where a resource is of diminished value, on the other hand, damages should be
calculated to account for lost use based upon the residual services the tainted
resource may afford. For example, if a drinking water supply is polluted such that
it can no longer be used for potable water, it may nevertheless be suitable for fire
protection or irrigation. Although the court in New Mexico v. General Electric
concluded that there was no lost use at all, it remarked on the opportunity to use
polluted water for non-drinking purposes in evaluating the measure of damages for
loss of use.2 In other words, at least for groundwater, there is a hierarchy of uses
which should be evaluated when measuring loss of service damages.222 For example,
reclaimed water, while not suitable for consumption, could be used for irrigation.
If the value for irrigation is one-tenth the value for consumption, the actual damages
should then be ninety percent of the value of drinking water.
5. Remedy Was Not Dedicated to Restoration
CERCLA specifically restricts the permissible uses of sums recovered for natural
resource damages. Trustees retain the funds "for use only to restore, replace, or
acquire the equivalent of such natural resources. ''223 The necessity of using such
funds for primary restoration (to restore injured resources to baseline or replace
them) is simple and easily understood. But natural resource damages "shall not be
limited by the sums which can be used to restore or replace such resources. '224 This
creates a more nebulous status for damage recoveries above and beyond primary
restoration.
Where a resource is not currently or actually being used, "lost use" would be a
windfall to the trustee. The windfall aspect is easily understood concerning lost
present use. For example, if an aquifer were tainted but it was so far from any well
that the pollution never reached a well, there would be no present lost use. Thus,
even a penny of natural resource damages would be a windfall, because cleanup
costs are already recovered through routine CERCLA liability.
Lost prospective use or future use, on the other hand, is more of a speculative
continuum. For example, what if a permitted drinking water well was sunk in an
area thought to be free from contamination but the initial sample from the well
proved the water to be contaminated by a hazardous substance? In this situation, the
use lost would be future use, as the well was never productive. The DOI regulations,
which require that recovery for future uses be restricted to uses the State has already
tangibly recognized (permitted or committed to granting), would recognize loss of
a brand new well as a lost use since the State had committed to using the well for
that purpose. The D.C. Circuit has validated this approach in DOI's "committed

221.
222.
223.
224.

Gen. Elec. 111,
467 F.3d at 1252.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
Id.
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use" requirement because it prevents damages that are purely speculative, but
allows recovery for reasonably certain, "impending" uses.22 5
Adopting this approach necessarily involves drawing a bright line rule with
projects that are sufficiently concrete to bring the damages out of the world of mere
speculation. Yet, at the same time, such damages are under-inclusive, because this
approach necessarily eliminates some speculative recoveries that are likely or even
probable. For example, if a city is expected to double in population over the next
decade, city planners might justifiably rely on untapped aquifer capacity to meet
this emerging need. The city might anticipate that additional wells would be needed
over the next decade to meet exploding demand, but no commitments, permits or
authorizations for expansion may have been granted yet.
But suppose in the above hypothetical that a contaminated plume were discovered next week. In this situation, the contaminated water would be lost to both
present use and use over the foreseeable corrective period (say thirty years).
Because present supplies ensure sufficient water for current consumption, there
would be no immediate lost use. Here, the projected need would not have ripened
into a commitment; thus, the lost prospective use would be uncompensated. In this
example, if the groundwater being restored were projected to be needed to sustain
the increased population in 2010, the cost of an alternate supply would go
uncompensated for over twenty-five years.
New Mexico's theories of recovery were based upon more conjecture than the
above example, envisioning a new reservoir to meet the drinking water needs of
future users. This remedy, however, was entirely out of scope with the demonstrated
environmental harm, in view of the response actions already taken. 226 Allegations
of damages were grossly overstated and, perhaps due to the indication that funds
collected would be deposited in the State general fund, could be viewed as thinlyveiled attempts by the AG to line the State's coffers. 7
Contrary to CERCLA's overarching goal of cleaning up hazardous waste, an
"unrestricted award of money damages does not restore or replace contaminated
natural resources., 228 The deposit of damages in the State's general treasury fund
would impermissibly allow unrestricted use of the funds by the State. But notably,
the circuit court did not suggest that state laws are completely preempted whenever
there is ongoing remediation. In addition, the court did not categorically disapprove
of State formulas for valuation.229 Indeed, because preemption was found based
upon misdirection of the recovered funds, the court had no duty to consider these
issues.
It is clear that reform is needed with respect to the NRD program. Richard
Stewart, a law professor at New York University, has long been calling for such
reform to the NRD program to "[e]liminate all forms of the unfair surplus claims
which have been created by the trustees... so that the NRD program can focus on

225. Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
226. Gen. Elec. II1, 467 F.3d at 1242, 1245-48.
227. See id.at 1248 (funds used, for example, for attorney fees would undermine legitimate funding to restore
damaged resources).
228. Id. at 1247.
229. Id.
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actual restoration."2 3 Surplus claims, such as claims for damages based upon lost
use of resources when there was, in fact, no "loss of use," generate revenues above
those needed to restore the environment. 231 Thus, whether called a windfall or an
unfair surplus, the message remains the same: they have no appropriate function in
an NRD assessment.
6. Schizophrenic Pre-trial Posturing
Although a trustee can consolidate state and federal claims in federal court, the
opposite is not the case. State trustees must be especially careful if they intend to
exclusively seek state remedies for damaged natural resources in state court.232 As
shown in the New Mexico case, a "kitchen sink approach" (suing in both state and
federal courts simultaneously) could lead to unforeseen pitfalls like having the case
decided in federal court when the State might ultimately prefer state court. A
tandem question in the selection of forum is the preemptive effect of CERCLA on
comparable state laws.
While CERCLA clearly embraces lost use as a component of damages, state
efforts to work alongside CERCLA must ensure that their local remedies are equally
far reaching. Otherwise, a case brought in the state court system will lose access to
recovery for lost use during the period when the public was deprived of a useful and
beneficial resource. For example, an argument was made in New Jersey alleging
that restoration of the natural resource was authorized under the state NRD scheme,
but the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act) 233 was not broad
enough to encompass loss of use.2 34 Efforts under New Jersey law and in other
jurisdictions are discussed next.
IV. ALTERNATIVES WITH MORE PROMISE
A. The New Jersey Approach
New Jersey has the most Superfund sites in the nation.235 It already had an active
NRD program in place in 2002-03, when its trustee, the director of New Jersey's
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), decided to accelerate its
efforts. 236 Despite progress in earlier years, NJDEP had "resolved only a small
percentage" of the "more than 4,000 potential claims for natural resource damages

230. Superfund ReauthorizationandReform Legis.: Hearing on H.R. 2727 Before the House Subcomm. on
Water Resources and the Environment, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Richard Stewart, Professor of
Environmental Law); see also Richard B. Stewart et al., Evaluating the PresentNatural Resource Damages
Regime: The Lawyer's Perspective, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PoLICY

ANALYSIS 163 (Richard B. Stewart ed., 1995) (valuation is the most vexing issue for trustees).
231. See Hearing on H.R. 2727, supra note 230.
232. Federal trustees initiate NRD actions in the federal district where the pollution occurred or where
defendants' principal offices are located. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (2000).
233. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (West 2006).
234. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 A.2d 345,347 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(holding that trial court erred in finding Spill Act did not allow such claims).
235. NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supra note 85, at 41. New Jersey oversees about 23,000 contaminated
sites. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Site Remediation and Waste Management
Brownfields FAQ, http://www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/faq/brownfields.faq.pdf (last visited Jul. 24,2008).
236. Policy Directive 2003-07, supranote 14.
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'
New Jersey issued a policy directive in September 2003 to encourage
(NRD)."237
voluntary restoration efforts and NRD settlements. In a separate directive, issued
the same month and expected to generate up to $950 million in damages and
restoration,238 NJDEP ordered sixty-six PRPs in the Lower Passaic River to perform
their own damages assessments of injured resources.239
These policy directives do not specifically link their authority to either state or
federal law. 21 In ensuing years, however, over seventy-five lawsuits have been
initiated with complaints alleging violations of the New Jersey Spill Act, common
law public nuisance, and trespass.24 ' The suits under these New Jersey remedies
concern petroleum based spills 24 2 as well as CERCLA-covered releases. 243 The New
Jersey approach has proven to be successful in both settling and restoring Superfund
sites.

1. Successful Techniques
New Jersey has overcome the assessment funding barrier by allowing its Spill
Fund to be used to assess NRDs. 2' A number of other States have also created
similar environmental funds that can only be used for response to hazardous substance or oil releases, including costs to assess such damages. Not surprisingly,
these States, including New Jersey, have the most active NRD programs. Commitment of a State to its environment starts with dedicating resources to enable the
trustees to do their jobs. Such resources allow a State to aggressively enforce its
laws.
Adopting aggressive collection measures has proven successful to the State from
a settlement perspective. NJDEP's Natural Resource Damage Program "has
recovered more than $51 million and preserved approximately 6,000 acres of open
for
space as wildlife habitat and ground water recharge areas as compensation
24 5
pollution resulting from 1,500 contaminated sites and oil spills.
Damage recoveries serve an important function in reimbursing the State for costs
of assessment and stimulating ongoing claims development and recovery. 246 The
increased emphasis on NRDs (coupled with the resources to pursue them) has
generated important headway for the State in improving its environment. At a
minimum, the measures have been successful in bringing closure to a large number
237. Id. "NJDEP prosecuted fewer than thirty NRD claims from 1999 through 2002." Kelly etal., supranote
15, at 356 n.58.
238. Kelly et al., supranote 15, at 356.
239. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Policy Directive 2003-01 (Sept. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.nj.gov/dep/newsrel/releases/passaic -dirOl.pdf. The PRP's insurers were simultaneously notified.
240. See Policy Directive 2003-07, supra note 14.
241. Ira Gottlieb & Cynthia M. Stencel, An Overview of New Jersey'sNaturalResource Damage Initiative.
HARRIsMARTsN'S NATURAL REsouRcE DAMAGES & ENVTL. CLAims RPT., Premier 2006, at 1, 4-7.
242. See, e.g., N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 923 A.2d 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

2007).
243. See, e.g., N.J. Dep'tof Envtl. Prot. v. Minn. Mining& Mfg. Co., No. 06-2612(NLH) 2007 WL2027916
(D.N.J. July 5, 2007).
244. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f (West 2006).
245.
246.

Press Release, supra note 14.
Policy Directive 2003-07, supra note 14. The New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund can also be used

for this critical NRD assessment purpose, perhaps explaining in part why New Jersey has been successful in
overcoming funding shortfalls confronting most other trustees. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.1 l7 (West 2006).
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of cases. In those that remain, the State has an aggressive litigation policy. While
the cases decided to date have not always validated the State's approach, the
following observations should be helpful to those watching on the sidelines.
New Jersey encourages settlement with a "preference for restoration."24' 7 In lieu
of monetary damages, the State prefers performance of restorative work and
resource protection, "provided that reasonable allowance is made for monitoring
'
NJDEP recognizes that substitute
and oversight to ensure accountability."248
resources or resource services may often be more cost-effective and "encourages
habitat equivalency analysis, consideration of both in-kind and out-of-kind
substitute resources, and similar efforts to provide substantially equivalent resource
services in designing compensatory restoration projects."24' 9 For example, for lost
recreational uses, NJDEP agreed to consider "enhancements to public access,
creation of or improvements to state or local parks, or the provision of other
25 But, "[r]estoration projects, whether
alternate recreational opportunities.""
implemented by DEP or a responsible party, must bear a nexus to the injured
resource and should be in the same watershed (or sub-watershed) to the extent
practicable."25 '
Additional direction is focused on injured groundwater: "acquisition of aquifer
recharge areas, water re-use or recycling projects, infrastructure improvements to
control stormwater or improve recharge, reforestation efforts to improve infiltration
and water retention, or any other measure that enhances the water resource base in
the affected area will be considered."25' 2 The more controversial aspect of
groundwater is the use of the State's groundwater valuation formula as a "settlement tool" when appropriate restorative measures can not be set.
New Jersey has convinced its own courts of both its authority and stewardship
to effectively manage public resources under state law for the public good.253 The
Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey agreed, holding, "Based on
their statutory duties, the Court finds that both NJDEP and the Spill Administrator
perform essential government functions carried out on behalf of the State for the
ultimate benefit of New Jersey's citizens."254 Indeed, the New Jersey state law

247. Policy Directive 2003-07, supra note 14.
248. Id.
249. Id.

250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 A.2d 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007); see also N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 06-4025, 2007 WL 703539 (D.N.J. Mar. 2,
2007) (remanding to state court). The State is vested with authority "to conserve and protect natural resources,
prevent pollution and protect the public health and safety." Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-9 (West 2006)).
254. Nestle, 2007 WL 703539, at *2 (citation omitted).
Moreover, New Jersey has a significant interest in this matter; here, the State's interest is
nothing less than the protection of New Jersey's groundwater from hazardous spills. Indeed, the
Plaintiffs in this matter seek damages to pay for the rehabilitation and restoration of the State's
natural resources that were injured as a result of a discharge at Defendant's plant. Moreover, the
Plaintiffs have vigorously pursued the state's interest by initiating and pursuing this litigation.
Finally, the Court notes that the state's interest in this matter is not a general desire to secure
compliance with state laws, but, as discussed above, a specific interest to protect and rehabilitate
the State's groundwater and natural resources. Based on the essential functions of the NJDEP
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remedies (statutory and common law) precede enactment of CERCLA.255
Nevertheless, New Jersey finds itself in both the federal and state courts
litigating different NRD cases.256 While defendants have sought removal to the
federal courts, New Jersey has successfully returned some cases to state court.257
For example, in New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Nestle
USA 258 the federal court found that New Jersey was the real party in interest in an
NRD matter, "[b]ased on the essential functions of the NJDEP and the [New Jersey]
Spill Administrator and because of the significant state interest implicated in the
' Since the State was a party to the litigation, there was no
underlying dispute."259
federal diversity jurisdiction and removal was improper.2"
Scrutiny is required to evaluate whether New Jersey laws create more leeway for
state trustees than their CERCLA counterparts create for federal trustees. Interestingly enough, a New Jersey court has cited with approval an NJDEP regulation
262
26
defining damages under the Spill Act ' by reference to the CERCLA definition.
2. Lingering Issues/Inadequacies
Although the appellate court upheld New Jersey's entitlement to seek "loss of
use" damages in Exxon-Mobil, the New Jersey courts have not yet addressed what
the State must prove to establish loss of use. In addition to the burden of proving
loss of use values, the confluence of state NRD laws and CERCLA comes
immediately to the fore: where does CERCLA end and state law begin? Of course,
the answer will differ on a state by state basis. Nevertheless, in each case alleging
state remedies, the notion of conflict preemption may arise.263
Conflict preemption occurs "when it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.- 264 For example, the courts must
decide whether CERCLA preempts the New Jersey groundwater valuations. Even
though CERCLA explicitly allows non-conflicting state strategies, the court must

and the NJ Spill Administrator and because of the significant state interest implicated in the
underlying dispute, the Court finds that New Jersey is the real party in interest in this matter.
Since the State is a party to this litigation, there is no diversity between the parties for purposes
of federal jurisdiction. Thus, removal was improper....
Id. (citation omitted).
255. See, e.g., Howell Twp. v. Waste Disposal, Inc. 504 A.2d 19, 25-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
(discussing continued vitality of state interest in protecting environment even after citizen suit provisions were
adopted in environmental laws)).
256. Compare Exxon Mobil, 923 A.2d 345 (state court) with N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co., No. 06-2612(NLH), 2007 WL 2027916 (D.N.J. July 5, 2007) (federal court decision to remand to state
court), and Nestle, 2007 WL 703539 (same).
257. See, e.g., Minn. Mining &Mfg. Co., 2007 WL 2027916, at *6 (motion to remand to state court granted),
Nestle, 2007 WL 703539, at *1-2.
258. 2007 WL703539.
259. Id. at *2.
260. Id.
261. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11 to 23.24 (West 2006). New Jersey also enjoys statutory NRD authority
under the New Jersey Water Pollution Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10A-10 (West 2006).
262. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 A.2d 345, 348-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007).
263. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
264. Id. (citations omitted).
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still analyze whether the New Jersey groundwater evaluation formula conflicts with
CERCLA.
In New Mexico v. General Electric, for example, the court held:
CERCLA's comprehensive NRD scheme preempts any state remedy designed
to achieve something other than the restoration, replacement, or acquisition of
the equivalent of a contaminated natural resource....
[T]he remedy the State seeks to obtain through [state public nuisance and
negligence] causes of action-an unrestricted award of money damages-cannot
withstand CERCLA's comprehensive NRD scheme.265
New Jersey has a much better chance of surviving the above scrutiny, because it
requires that any damages recovered be deposited in the New Jersey Spill Fund, and
it restricts the use of this fund to costs of assessment and restoration.2 66
Therefore, it is likely that New Jersey groundwater valuations will not be
preempted. But it remains unclear whether other courts will require actual proof of
lost uses like the Tenth Circuit.2 67 In the alternative, other courts may conclude that
a showing of commitment to use the resource will suffice, or these courts might
allow more speculation about the future value of the groundwater.
One thing that is certain about the outcome in one New Jersey case, however, is
that Exxon Mobil will be liable for costs of restoration because they have not
disputed liability for physical restoration of the natural resources. 268 Given the
language of CERCLA and the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Congress's preference
for restoration, such an approach seems eminently sound and worthy of replication.
However, the preference for restoration begs the question of what is adequate
restoration? As discussed next, the New Jersey Policy Directive helps to answer this
question.
The New Jersey Policy Directive authorizes "restoration work and resource
protection" in the affected area as well as substituting resources or resource services
"both in-kind and out-of-kind. 269 The idea is sound. For example, if tainted groundwater cannot be used as drinking water, securing necessary rights and installing a
new replacement well would be an in-kind substitute. Agreeing to provide bottled
water to the affected community until the groundwater is remediated would be an
example of an out-of-kind substitution. In either scenario, the responsible party will
remain liable for the cleanup while paying for the damage caused to the natural
resources.
Although such an approach is desirable if the parties agree, such a preference
might pose problems if the parties cannot agree and instead proceed to court. Would
the courts be in a position to dictate the nature and scope of these in-kind and outof-kind substitutes? And how would such measures be ordered and enforced? In the
alternative, would the courts be able to place a monetary value on these costs as
damages? Assume for a moment that New Jersey collects dollars in exchange for

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Gen. Elec. 111,
467 F.3d 1223, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2006).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11f (West 2006).
See supra Part 11l.B.4.a.
N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 A.2d 345, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
Policy Directive 2003-07, supra note 14.
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loss of use of natural resources. This is a hollow victory without systematic
restoration of the State's natural resources. In fact, translating dollars collected back
into benefits for the environment might be every bit as hard as calculating the dollar
value that equates to such damages in the first place. The U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO), in a study conducted a decade ago, noted this practical disconnect
between damages and restoration.27
A number of factors complicate the efforts of trustees who have done everything
right and have collected NRDs. Commencing on-site restoration must often await
completion of cleanup27' (a seemingly never-ending task with a pump and treat
remedy). Furthermore, NRD monies collected may be insufficient to actually pay
for necessary restoration or replacement. A financial gap may form an insurmountable hurdle that leaves funds idle or allows them to collect dust as they await
additional collections or matching appropriations from the State.27
3. The Need for Continued Reform
Congress intended that natural resource damage trustees should have a quick and
easy NRD option.273 That has not happened at the federal level.274 While some
States have sought their own alternatives 275 (some more effectively than others), to
date NRD recoveries have failed to meet their full potential, to the detriment of
society.
Because there is no well-defined standard, the tendency is to overdevelop a case
so as not to risk failure if the assessment effort is challenged in court. This promotes
costly and time-consuming assessment processes by all potential litigants. Since the
polluter should ultimately pay for these costs (where costs are reasonable and the
trustee prevails), one would expect that this would only be a minor deterrent for
trustees. However, such a costly and process-intense methodology is of little utility
in many cases and may be beyond the scope of the resources available to the trustee
in the first place. Therefore, even though the NRDA is the key to the vault of NRDs,
many trustees cannot afford the costs of this key.
With no consistent NRDA method, there can be no consistent NRD valuation.
Even when following an approved NRDA process, there may be inconsistent
evaluations based upon assumptions used in modeling that may or may not conform
270. U.S. GEN.

ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: STATUS OF SELECTED FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCE

DAMAGE SETTLEMENTS RCED-97-10 at 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter GAO, 1996 SETTLEMENTS STATUS], availableat
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc97010.pdf.
271. Id. at 4. Pump-and-treat remedies-pumping the groundwater to the surface, treating it to remove
contamination, and then re-injecting the treated water at the site-have been notoriously slow and inefficient. See
generallyU.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, IMPROVING NATIONWIDE
EFFECTIVENESS OF PUMP-AND-TREAT REMEDIES REQUIRES SUSTAINED AND FOCUSED ACTION TO REALIZE

BENEFITS, REP. NO. 2003-P-000006 (2003), availableat http://www.epa.gov/superfund/cleanup/postconstuction/
oigptreport.pdf.
272. See GAO, 1996 SETTLEMENTS STATUS, supra note 270, at 4-5. Settlements may allow a stream of
payments versus a lump sum, forcing trustees to delay restorative efforts until a critical mass is accumulated. Id.
at 30 (Commerce Department comments to GAO).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (2000).
274. See 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 4-5 (proposing actions for "faster, more efficient, and more
effective restoration of injured natural resources").
275. Amy W. Ando & Madhu Khanna, Natural Resource Damage Assessment Methods: Lessons in
Simplicity from State Trustees, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 504, 505-06 (2004).
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to reality. A tension in the system exists between the need for transparency in the
assessment (a formula that is simple to understand and follow) and the quest for the
most precise evaluation, which relies upon the "best available science." When the
best available science relies, in turn, on models or surveys of public behavior or
values, the "science" loses transparency and interjects variables that substitute
possibilities or probabilities for what actually occurred. Thus, the best way around
valuation difficulties may be to require restoration of lost resources in lieu of
monetary damages equating to the value of the damages.
It is precisely because NRDs are so hard to pin down that these costs to restore
the environment are often either impractical or impossible to prove. In fact, the
proper measure of natural resource damages lies somewhere between a "blank
check" and an "IOU." At the "blank check" end of the spectrum, States could seek
damages entirely out of line with the actual damage to the environment.276 At the
"IOU" end of the spectrum, States whose trustees are underfunded or who are not
provided sufficient tools to obtain appropriate NRDs are left with an "IOU" from
the regulated community that creates undesirable situations for all involved. Those
being regulated have uncertain future liability that may depress the marketability
or reuse of their property. Furthermore, NRD liability may need to be carried in
some manner on their books. Specific NRD insurance requirements might be one
277
solution to prevent businesses from unknown and unknowable damages.
However, the public loses any time there is contamination without the prospect of
appropriate liability. The correct amount of NRDs forces industry to internalize the
costs of pollution and pass those costs on to their consumers. Once internalized,
consumers can make more environmentally sound choices.
B. Simplified Strategies Used by Other States
In 2004, the Journal of Contemporary Economic Policy published an article
discussing simplified NRD methodologies implemented by state trustees.27 8 The
article was based upon a nationwide study of trustees that was published earlier that
year. 279 Based on the results, it appears that trustees are struggling for ways to
credibly determine natural resource damages using data that is already available
about the injury, without having to resort to complex, sophisticated, timeconsuming, and costly assessments.28 0

276. Arguably, the litigation posture of the State of New Mexico fell into this "blank check" approach.
277. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 293, 309-22 (2002) (advocating insurance to insulate against environmental liabilities including natural
resource damages). One problem with conventional environmental insurance might be the "time-on-the-risk"
allocation, which would allow insurance awards for a continuing environmental harm (for example leaching) to
be reduced by the annual share of liability the purchaser agreed to absorb as a deductible. For example, if an insured
had a $50,000 annual deductible and the process of contamination endured over twenty years, the insurance
recovery would be reduced by one million dollars. See Mich. CourtAffirms "Time On the Risk" Allocation in
Environmental Case, HARRISMARTIN'S GLOBAL WARMING & NATURAL RES. DAMAGES REPORT, Apr. 2007, at
8 (citing Wolverine World Wide Inc. v. Uberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 260330 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007)).
278. Ando & Khanna, supra note 275.
279. NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supra note 85. A survey of trustees in 2006 confirms the continued
vitality of the conclusions drawn from the survey. See IsRAEL, supra note 19, § 32B.12 at 32B- 118 ("A State-byState Guide to NRD Programs in All 50 States").
280. See NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supra note 85, at 2.
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This trend mirrors the goal of Congress in directing the President to develop
Type A Regulations in the first place. For States using their own simplified
methods, "the estimate that emerges is, however, likely to be somewhat inaccurate
and more vulnerable to challenge by a potentially responsible party (PRP) if the
' There are,
case cannot be settled out of court."281
therefore, two sides to the
simplified methodology coin: (1) the ability to assess quickly and cheaply in cases
that reach settlement and, for cases that do not settle, (2) the necessity to start over
with more costly assessment measures or risk losing a litigated case.
Notwithstanding these risks, some States have developed simplified assessment
methodologies.282 Since "a wide variety of assessment methods have been shown
in practice to be successful tools.. .that will stand up in a settlement-negotiation
process,",283 other trustees should be receptive to implementing simplified
procedures. In addition, DOI should be receptive to developing similar simplified
methodologies to support settlements.
The most successful state methodologies share the following advantageous
characteristics: (1) they are integrated into the state law, (2) they utilize information
already required to be obtained under other state or federal laws, (3) the
methodology is in some way linked to restoration, (4) a variable in the methodology
is habitat dependent, and (5) the laws are reasonably transparent. 284 It would be
ideal if any of the current methodologies satisfied all five attributes. However, since
none of them do, 285 each attribute is instead explained in the context of one or more
State's approaches.
Although many States have their own laws addressing NRDs,286 only a few, such
as Florida, New Jersey, and Washington, include simplified assessment methodologies within their state laws. 287 New Jersey's provisions are, in part, regulatory
versus statutory, raising the specter of a legal challenge for incompatibility with the
statutory scheme.288 On a positive note, regulations are easier to update or change
if better simplified methods emerge. But all of the state laws could be improved by
introducing a presumption in favor of the trustee if the methodologies are followed.
If less vulnerable to legal challenge, "transaction costs would be lower, and social
welfare would be increased. 289
California's simplified methodology is perhaps the most transparent and easiest

281. Id.
282. These states include Florida, California, Washington, Minnesota, and New Jersey. Ando & Khanna,
supra note 274, at 507.
283. NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supra note 85, at 15.
284. As an ideal, Ando and Khanna recommend the following characteristics: simple to use, legally
recognized, transparent, damage estimates correlate to scope of injuries, net present value is calculated
appropriately, and estimates reflect loss of both use and nonuse values and are reflective of socioeconomic
characteristics of the affected population. Ando & Khanna, supranote 275, at 507.
285. See id. at 517 ("[Tlhese methods are flawed in ways that are likely to induce chronic bias in the
estimates they yield. Thus, there could be a large payoff to society if simplified methods less egregiously at odds
with economic theory of valuation could be used instead.").
286. See generally ISRAEL, supra note 19, § 32B.12, at 32B-118 to 155 (twenty-four states identified with
NRD statutes).
287. NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supra note 85, at 25.

288. Id. at 42-43. For the latest version of New Jersey groundwater regulations, see http://www.nj.gov/
dep/srp/regs/techrule/ (last visited July 26, 2008).
289. Ando & Khanna, supra note 275, at 506.
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to implement. It also satisfies characteristics two through four above because it uses
information already reported to the State, is restoration focused, and is based upon
the types of habitat injured.2" Using existing habitat-equivalency analysis derived
from earlier case-specific studies, members of California's Department of Fish and
Game divided their state habitats into eight types and then established a different
table of damages for each habitat type.29' The average costs established in previous
studies to return each habitat type to baseline conditions was calculated per unit of
habitat affected, and the results generated a matrix of values based on the duration
of injury on one axis and the degree of injury on the other.292 Using the tables, the
cost information per unit of habitat from the chart is then simply multiplied by the
total units of habitat affected.293 Other States' simplified assessments are not as
clear or straightforward to implement.
Washington and Florida primarily use simplified assessment methods for oil
spills, although Florida's statute permits its use for other hazardous substances as
well.294 Both States ascribe different values based upon the harmfulness of the oil
also consider the location of the spill and type
released and the spill volume. 295 Both
296
and quantity of habitat affected.
Florida uses three categories for harmfulness and twelve habitat types to break
down a cost per unit of habitat damaged.297 This cost is then multiplied by the
amount of impacted area (similar to the California approach). 29' In addition, Florida
also considers factors based upon location of the spill (such as distance from shore
or special management area), compensation for wildlife deaths of endangered
299
species or threatened species, and an additive cost of the assessment itself.

Washington's methodology is somewhat more complex. Harmfulness has three
components, including acute toxicity, mechanical injury (based on the specific
gravity of the oil spilled), and persistence scores rated from one to five.3t ° Habitat
vulnerability is based upon a statewide habitat inventory that ascribes different
values for "sixteen marine and estuarine regions and one hundred and thirty-one sub

regions....,,30 The marine and estuarine environments are further subdivided into

thirty-seven habitat types.3 2 Vulnerability scores are increased if a species of
importance, a threatened species, or an endangered species has been exposed to the

290. Id. at 507-09.
291. Id. at 509.
292. Id.
293. Id. Ando and Khanna note that the model fails to estimate and include lost human use values, such as

recreational activities, thereby understating this component ofNRDs. Id. It would seem that this shortcoming could
be overcome if a lost use component could be added to the per unit damages based upon average values for such
services in each of the eight habitats. In addition, annual increases for inflation (or based upon more recent actual
restoration cost experience) would safeguard such a method from obsolescence over time.
294. Id. at 509-10. Washington's simplified methodology is exclusively available for oil spills. Id. at 510.
295. NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supra note 85, at 29-36 (Washington), 36-40 (Florida).
296. Ando & Khanna, supra note 275, at 510.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300.

NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supra note 85, at 29.

301.

Id.

302.

Id. at 30.

Spring 2008)

NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES UNDER CERCLA

spill.3" 3 Some of the factors are additive while others are multipliers, including a
normalization factor used to bring damages into a range of one to fifty dollars per
gallon spilled. 33' Finally, a credit in the form of a reduction is applied to account for
response measures by the polluter at the time of the spill. However, even the most
responsible PRP cleanup results in damages of at least one dollar per gallon of oil
spilled. °5
As demonstrated in the various approaches, there is a trade-off between precision
and transparency. Although all of these models are easy to use (they all involve
plugging existing data into a table, matrix, or formula), when more variables are
added, the methodology
becomes harder to follow. The Type A federal rules suffer
3°6
from this same fault.
In ongoing efforts to review and improve federal NRD rules, DOI-sponsored
study groups should thoughtfully consider these various simplified state approaches.
The federal government should benefit from the efforts-successes and
mistakes-of the simplified state programs. Because these programs serve as a
laboratory for different methodologies, it is only logical that the federal government
would want to capture and share the best aspects of each program.
V. COOPERATION VERSUS LITIGATION
A. Advantages of Cooperation
"As NRD enforcement has evolved, government trustees and potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) have increasingly sought to work cooperatively to assess
natural resource damages. 30 7 Cooperation potentially benefits both parties and the
environment. By avoiding lengthy litigation, the restoration work can begin much
sooner, which is a clear win for the environment.30 8 In addition, cooperation usually
entails the PRP funding the costs of assessment."
Natural resource trustees are generally understaffed and under-funded.3"0 Because
the cost of NRD assessment can be expensive, 311 this under-funding presents a

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id. at 32.
See id.
See supra Part II.C.3.
Israel, supra note 18, at 4.
A goal of NOAA's Cooperative Assessment Project (CAP) is to "expedite the restoration of injured

natural resources." OFFICE OF RESPONSE & RESTORATION, NAT. OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., COOPERATIVE
ASSESSMENT PROCESS (2005), http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/partner/cap/pdf/orrcapv2_508.pdf.
309. ISRAEL, supra note 19, at 32B-58 (citing OFFICE OF RESPONSE & RESTORATION, NAT. OCEANIC &

ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., COOPERATIVE ASSESSMENT PROCESS (CAP) FRAMEWORK (2003), http://www.darrp.noaa.

gov/partner/cap/pdf/capframe.pdf [hereinafter NOAA CAP FRAMEWORK]); DO 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS,
supra note 197, at 1.

310. See ISRAEL, supra note 19, § 32B.09[1][e] at 32B-85 ("[A]bsent a willing PRP to conduct the
assessment, the trustees will simply have to delay or postpone its NRD assessment, and in some cases may never
conduct the assessment."); NRDA METHODS AND CASES, supra note 85, at 3, 5 (fourteen states with no NRD

program, others generally have few staff members and do not employ an economist); see also GAO, 2003 STATUS
& CHALLENGES, supra note 4, at 25 (the crisis may be most severe for state trustees as "[olfficials in 6 of the 10
EPA regions agreed that states in their region faced fiscal problems and anticipated that shortfalls could cause
problems with state's future cleanup capabilities").
311. "Trustee assessment costs for the Exxon Valdez exceeded $100 million for studies." Bill Conner & Ron
Gouguet, Getting to Restoration,ENVTL. FORuM May-June 2004, at 20, availableat http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/
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hurdle that trustees must overcome in pursuit of NRDs. Even though responsible
parties are ultimately on the hook for the costs of assessment, if the trustee lacks the
seed money to perform a defensible assessment in the first place, the process of
recovery is never triggered and the environment is never restored. NOAA
recognizes this sad reality in its Cooperative Assessment Project (CAP) framework.3" 2 DOI implicitly acknowledges the same phenomena in its budgeting process,
whereby it prioritizes approval of cooperative assessments with PRPs in order to
free its sparse appropriated assessment dollars for other promising proposals from
the field.313
Cooperation provides a means around the funding problem by allowing the
responsible parties to fund the assessment in the first place. As mentioned, the PRP
is liable for the assessment costs anyway, so there is no legal disadvantage (if the
responsible party is in fact liable) from performing the assessment and absorbing
those costs now versus later. In practice, there is actually a financial advantage to
the PRP from partnering in the assessment because participation affords better
insight with respect to the assessment and better control over its associated costs.
NOAA even allows cooperative, cautious assumptions that are protective of the
environment to substitute for expensive studies where there is no need for litigationquality assessments. 1 4
Cooperation also ensures that the responsible party understands the methodology
and the data derived from the restoration assessment itself, so there should be less
suspicion as to the amount of restoration necessary. Much like PRPs would rather
take charge of the cleanups under CERCLA (for the same beneficial control
concerns), 1 5 PRPs can also serve their own practical interests by conducting the
NRD assessments. Proactive restoration measures can be adopted that take
advantage of opportunities for restoration in tandem with ongoing remediation.
"Sensible early restoration" can restore the injured resource more quickly. 316 This
should result in reduced financial exposure to loss of use damages.3 17 In addition,
the PRP can help transform its public image from "bad guy" to "good guy" through
positive recognition from the trustee that the PRP is part of the solution, not a
recalcitrant polluter unwilling to own up to its liabilities.3 18

partner/cap/pdf/gtreliO4.pdf. The table at 28 shows representative costs of assessment ranging from $460,000 to
$2,000,000. Id. at 28.
312. See NOAA CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 309, at 2 ("Trustees may further benefit by: restoring
contaminated sites that might not otherwise be addressed or [that might] be addressed more slowly....").
313. DOI 2007 BUDGErJUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 197, at 1, 21-22 (more proposals than available funding; highest priority based on likelihood ofachieving restoration, and continued focus on cooperative assessments).
In 2006, the Department of the Interior received only about four million dollars per year in appropriated funds for
damages assessment; this amount was supplemented with about $1.5 million annually in recovered funds from
settlements. See id. at 21.
314. See Conner & Gouguet, supra note 311, at 27-28.
315. PRPs may lead cleanup efforts. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (2000).
316. Israel, supra note 18, at 4.
317. See id.
318. See NOAA CAP FRAMEWORK, supranote 309, at 2 (benefit to PRPs includes positive recognition from
trustees and public).
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The final advantage to both parties from cooperation is that it fosters a more
beneficial long-term relationship.319 By depolarizing the parties or defusing tensions
that are inevitable during litigation, a more beneficial long-term partnership is
fostered that is better suited to collectively addressing the traditionally long-lasting
restoration activities characteristic of CERCLA sites. NOAA captures this
sentiment nicely: "The greatest need and opportunity for cooperation.. are for sites
affected by chronic hazardous substance or oil contamination. 320
The cooperative approach is clearly gaining traction with many PRPs, as well as
the principal federal trustees. "The vast majority-over 95 percent--of NOAA's
trustee concerns at hazardous waste sites and oil spills are resolved using
cooperative, integrated approaches." 32 ' DOI "has been involved in over thirty-five
cooperative assessments across the country" (compare this number with its active
caseload of 68 cases, including 46 assessments).322 In addition, after two years of
study, in May 2007, the NRDAR Federal Advisory Committee recommended
efforts to push toward simplified methodology for assessment. The NRDAR placed
emphasis on restoration versus damages "by promoting cooperation-in lieu of
costly and time consuming adversarial processes-among natural resource trustees
and potentially responsible parties. '' 323
One way to deal with valuation problems is to avoid them. If valuation issues
cannot be avoided, another way to deal with them is to approach them cooperatively, especially since PRPs are liable for the assessment costs anyway. Both sides
can mutually ensure a defensible valuation that protects the interests of the public,
the environment, and industry while avoiding the expense and inconvenience of
litigation. Of course, if the PRPs will not agree to cooperate, the government has no
choice but to litigate. Otherwise, it seems that cooperation costs the government
nothing, since the results of successful cooperation are an agreed settlement. For
some PRPs, however, litigation will remain desirable when, for example, trustees
are unreasonable in their NRD demands.
B. Trade-offs
There are a number of trade-offs or sacrifices a PRP must make if it decides to
cooperate. Most notably, unless the PRPs are certain that they are liable for
damaged natural resources, they give up the ability to force the government to prove
its case. One advantage of litigation is that, "[u]nlike other environmental claims,
the government bears a significant burden of proof to show that the injury resulted
from a release or discharge by the defendant. 324
In court, the PRP also has the ability to challenge the NRDA itself. Even in those
remote cases when the rebuttable presumption arises, the defendant has an

319. This is analogous to the gain expected from alternative dispute resolution compared to litigation.
320. NOAA CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 309, at 3.
321. Nat. Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Assessment & Restoration Division website,
http://www.response.restoration.noaa.gov/orr-aboutowner.php?RECORDKEY%28owner-chosen%29=owne
r_id&ownerid(owner chosen)=7 (last visited July 27, 2008).
322. DOI 2007 BUDOET JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 197, at 17-19.
323. 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 7.
324. Israel, supra note 18, at 4.
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opportunity, at a minimum, to attempt to rebut the assessment."' For example,
"losses may be extrapolated to larger areas or populations [than warranted]," and
underlying assumptions may be unfounded.326
Other advantages of litigation include (1) opportunities for large corporations to
seek to develop desirable precedent, (2) the ability for culpable corporations to
delay paying what is owed, and (3) the prospect that the trustee will not file on time
or at all.327 In addition, the ecosystem that had been damaged may begin to rebound
on its own after the cleanup, and the potential exists that NRDs could diminish or
die off if sufficient time passes.3 2' For example, loss of a predator species (because
of factors unrelated to the pollution) could allow accelerated waterfowl recovery
due to lower than expected natural mortality rates. Or, unprecedented flooding
could dilute residual waterborne chemicals with a commensurate restorative effect.
Although these developments would be good news for the environment, they would
also reward foot-dragging by PRPs.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Where a statute is clear and constitutional, the courts should have no problem
enforcing it. The NRDA provisions of CERCLA appear clear. However, there is no
articulation in the statute concerning how to value compromised resources. Such a
shortcoming could be cured with additional legislation (specifying, for instance, a
methodology to be used to evaluate NRDs associated with contaminated
groundwater). In addition, the agencies charged with carrying out the congressional
NRD mandate are entitled to considerable deference in promulgating rules to
establish NRD valuations.3 29 Thus, either legislation or improved NRD regulations
are needed.
Although cooperative approaches should be commended, a more predictable
enforcement regime would better motivate responsible parties to cooperate rather
than litigate. All of the advantages of a cooperative approach discussed above can
be fostered through a "better/stronger/faster" litigation contingency for those who
do not settle or work with their respective trustees. As might be expected from the
discourse above, enabling the trustees to proceed in a simplified fashion and
allowing trustees the benefit of a presumption in favor of their assessment would
foster a more credible NRDA system.
As seen in the states of Florida and Washington, trustees can benefit from a
simplified system based upon a matrix of damages. Such simplified approaches are
still predicated on the most critical aspects of any discharge of hazardous
substances: namely, the characteristics of the substance(s) released, the volume
discharged, and the sensitivity of the receiving environment. The sensitivity canbe
further divided into sensitive flora, sensitive fauna, sensitive habitat, and otherwise
precious resources.
An "inflation factor" for destruction of rare or endangered plant or animal
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

The rebuttable presumption is "as yet untested in the courts." ISRAEL, supra note 19, at 32B-58.
Israel, supranote 18, at 4.
See id.
See id.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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species would motivate more cautious behavior when facing the prospect of losing
such biodiversity forever. While the cost of breeding and repopulating a species
may be available for some plants or animals, it would nevertheless be desirable to
at least include an educated guess at similar unknown expenses so that the value of
the NRDA is not understated.
If DOI were to promulgate a true simplified NRDA methodology at the time of
the next biennial review and revision, this would go a long way toward giving
trustees the tools they need to cheaply, quickly, and transparently conduct NRDAs.
Such methodologies would better motivate responsible parties to cooperate and
restore the environment. If Congress's true intent is to prefer restoration and if the
trustees could have the resources they need to motivate mutually beneficial
restoration programs, the giant might not sleep much longer. All society would
benefit from the acceleration of the corrective measures, and business and industry
would particularly benefit from putting these costs behind them.
Absent action on the part of DOI, Congress should review the decision charts in
use in Florida and Washington and adopt a similar measure as the simplified federal
standard. Creating a truly simple method that is easy to use and that carries either
a rebuttable presumption or strict liability for natural resource damages calculated
in conformity therewith would enable trustees to quickly pursue and collect
damages in the simplest cases.
Congress should also commit a few hundred million dollars to fund a "war chest"
for trustees under CERCLA to investigate and assess more complex natural
resource damages.3 3 ° Under the OPA, and under successful state programs, trustees
have access to their respective spill funds to perform such natural resource damage
assessments. 33' However, under the present CERCLA scheme, recourse to the
Superfund is unavailable unless "all administrative andjudicial remedies to recover
the amount... from persons who may be liable" have been exhausted.332
Unfortunately, when underfunded, the trustees cannot afford to assess the damages
to seek judicial remedies in the first place. Appropriating funds to conduct the
initial assessment, without first exhausting judicial remedies, would cure the
trustees' underfunding dilemma and should pay dividends later as the monies
recouped for the assessments are actually restored to the trustees to be used for
future assessments, restoration, or replacement of injured natural resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
However inauspicious my initial encounter with the subject of natural resource
damages, it served to alert me to the enormous potential benefit to the environment
that lay in appropriate use of NRDs. Where natural resource damages have been
330. For brownfield redevelopment, Congress put its money where its mouth is, authorizing "$200 million
in critically needed funds to assess and [remediate] brownfield sites as well as $50 million to [enhance] [s]tate
cleanup programs.. .double the [amount] of funding currently expended on the EPA brownfield program." See 147
Cong. Rec. 53886 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Smith); see also Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act, 42 U.S.C.A § 9604(k)(12)(A) (2005) (authorizing such funding for years
2002-2006).
331. See 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (a)(2) (2000) (access to Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund under OPA); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 58:10-23.11f7 (West 2006) (access to New Jersey Spill Fund under state law).
332. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(b)(2)(A) (2000).
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ignored, both the environment and the public affected by that environment continue
to suffer. Tragically, when trustees and PRPs entrench for litigation, opportunities
to promptly remedy past harms are lost for years or even decades.3 33 Therefore,
reinvigorating NRD recoveries benefits both nature and society.
While the cooperative restoration philosophy embraced by NOAA and
increasingly being embraced by DOI shows tremendous promise, regulatory or
statutory changes are nevertheless still necessary to enable trustees to enjoy a
valuable presumption in litigation. This Article suggests appropriate regulatory and
legislative changes to better allow trustees to carry out the functions Congress
originally intended.

333. See Conner & Gouguet, supra note 311, at 20 ("For a complex waste site, it takes at least five years to
conduct a damage assessment, and an additional five to 10 years if litigation is required").

